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MBUZINI
The Death of Samora Machel
19 October 1986
Dossier MZ-0017
The Context of the Mbuzini Disaster: the Southern African Crisis of October 1986
The Mbuzini disaster in which Samora Machel and 33 others died cannot be fully understood by limiting analysis to technical, navigational and aeronautical questions, although these are obviously essential elements in any comprehensive investigation. The competence of the aircrew, the safety record and condition of the Tupolev aircraft, whether or not a false beacon is technically feasible – all these aspects must be, and to some extent have been, carefully and impartially examined.
However, the context matters too. The question of how the Tupolev crashed and why, is as much political as technical. So is the question of why, decades later, the matter is not closed, the Mozambican commission of inquiry has neither reported nor been closed down, and periodic new investigations are announced, usually going nowhere.
In the weeks leading up to 19 October 1986 southern Africa was living through a major and increasingly violent political crisis, a crisis that continued for several months afterwards. Relations between the governments of Mozambique and South Africa were at an all-time low point, with the apartheid regime resorting to increasingly explicit warnings and threats if Mozambique did not bend to its will.
The crisis involved two main protagonists, apartheid South Africa and revolutionary Mozambique, as well as the African National Congress (ANC), the Frontline States, Malawi and Zaire. Pressure from the Frontline States on President Hastings Banda of Malawi in September resulted indirectly in a massive infiltration of MNR into central Mozambique; a landmine explosion inside South Africa that injured some SADF personnel enraged the apartheid regime, which suspended the recruitment of Mozambican labour for the South African mines; the possibility of a direct South African military intervention in Mozambique began to appear real, as threats and warnings escalated; and the Frontline States, far from backing down, began to exert pressure on President Mobutu sese Seko of Zaire, as they had done with Banda, to end his support for the UNITA rebels in Angola, another of «apartheid’s contra» movements.
Below, each one of these aspects of the crisis is summarised, with accessible resources listed in each section.
The MNR Infiltration from Malawi
By mid-1986, it was clear that President Hastings Banda of Malawi was collaborating with Pretoria in supporting the MNR. In May 1986, during a visit to Japan, Samora Machel accused him openly of doing this, and by August the Frontline States were beginning to adopt a stronger position regarding Malawian support for the MNR. On 11 September Machel, Kaunda and Mugabe travelled to Blantyre with a dossier of evidence to present to Banda, with a demand that he change his policy. Consequently, as David Hedges has written:
… South Africa began to infiltrate thousands of armed bandits, at times supported by South Africans and Malawians, into Zambézia province. A new wave of massacres, mutilations, destruction of infra-structures and massive displacement of people was thus set in motion … a total of about 12,000 bandits entered Zambézia, Tete and Niassa provinces from Malawi from the end of September 1986. [Journal of Southern African Studies vol.15 no.4 (October 1989), p.640-641, requires subscription].
The outcome of the pressure was therefore mixed from a Mozambican point of view. The MNR groups swarmed over Zambézia and Tete provinces, and several reports in October and November stated that there were white South African officers commanding their operations. In any event, the Malawian action precipitated a military and diplomatic crisis for the Maputo government, one that continued after Samora’s death. It was only after a military counter-offensive in December by the Mozambican armed forces, with Zimbabwean and Tanzanian support, and sustained diplomatic pressure maintained into early 1987, that Malawi began to show signs of honouring its commitments
Below, a selection of contemporary press reports on this aspect of the crisis.
Sources on MNR Infiltration
◊ 7 October 1986
More bandits sneak into Mozambique from Malawi. Herald [Harare] (7 October 1986). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 57 kb. A ‘huge infiltration’ of MNR into Tete and Zambézia provinces from Malawi is reported.
◊ 8 October 1986
Armed MNR bandits pour out of Malawi. Herald [Harare] (8 October 1986). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 112 kb. Malawi has ‘expelled’ several thousand armed MNR into Mozambique following recent pressure by FLS presidents on Hastings Banda.
◊ 9 October 1986
Malawi hands over Mozambican soldiers to Mozambican government. Radio broadcast from Blantyre on 9 October 1986, republished in the Summary of World Broadcasts [London]. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 48 kb. Reports that several hundred FAM soldiers who had fled from fighting with the MNR near Mulange had been handed back by the Malawian authorities.
◊ 10 October 1986
Town is deserted after MNR attack. Herald [Harare] (10 October 1986). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 237 kb. The small town of Zumbo in western Tete province has been overrun by MNR forces, and the population has fled.
◊ 11 October 1986
Wife is left to her fate; Mozambique soldiers flee rebel forces. Citizen [Johannesburg] (11 October 1986). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 266 kb. Somewhat delayed report on the fighting earlier in the month.
◊ 13 October 1986
4 Mozambican towns taken by rebels. Argus [Cape Town] (13 October 1986). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 118 kb. Reports the capture by the MNR of Zumbo and Mutarare in Tete, Caia in Sofala and Milange in Zambézia.
◊ 13 October 1986
Rebels claim massive inroads in north. Broadcast by Capital Radio, Umtata, on 13 October 1986, reprinted by the Summary of World Broadcasts [London]. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 37 kb. The Mozambican government is admitting the loss of control of some areas of the country.
Above: Hastings Kamuzu Banda (1898-1997), Life President of Malawi (1961-1994), who had been visited by a delegation of Frontline leaders in September to persuade him to stop his support for the MNR, and had subsequently propelled several thousand MNR fighters out of Malawi in what amounted to an invasion of central Mozambique.
◊ 13 October 1986
Anti-Mugabe radio on carnage of Zimbabwean troops in Mozambique. A propaganda broadcast, in the siNdebele language, from South Africa’s clandestine «Radio Truth», on 13 October 1986, translated and published in the Summary of World Broadcasts [London]. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 60 kb.
◊ 14 October 1986
Attacks from Malawi denied. Citizen [Johannesburg] (14 October 1986). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 48 kb. The MNR in Lisbon denies that has ever had ‘guerrilla forces nor logistic or other facilities in Malawian territory’.
◊ 14 October 1986
Planes violating Mozambican airspace come from Malawi. AIM-PANA report dated 14 October 1986, printed in the Summary of World Broadcasts [London]. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 57 kb. The provincial military commander of Niassa province says in the latest issue of the military magazine «25 de Setembro» that Renamo still has bases in Malawi and that aircraft and helicopters from Malawi continue to violate Mozambican airspace.
◊ 15 October 1986
Renamo controls biggest area yet. Cape Times [Cape Town] (15 October 1986). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 100 kb. A SAPA report says that the MNR ‘now controls the entire lower Zambezi valley’ and that only the Zimbabwean army is keeping the Zimbabwe-Malawi road link across Tete open.
◊ 15 October 1986
Michael Hornsby. Five towns fall to rebels. Times [London ] (15 October 1986). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 505 kb. Adds Ulongue in Tete to the list of small towns under MNR control.
◊ 17 October 1986
Refugees claim South Africans commanding MNR groups. Mozambican radio in English on 17 October 1986, printed in the Summary of World Broadcasts [London] (17 October 1986). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 58 kb.
◊ 18 October 1986
Chefiando BA’s, sul-africanos actuam na Mutarara, segundo testemunhos oculares. Notícias [Maputo] (18 October 1986). In Portuguese. Click here to download a PDF file, size 104 kb. Eyewitness reports say that South African officers have been seen commanding MNR fighters in Mutarara.
◊ 18 October 1986
Town overrun. Guardian [London] (18 October 1986). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 21 kb. The MNR claims to have captured Nhamatanda (the report uses the old colonial name of «Vila Machado»).
◊ 11 November 1986
Caroline Allen. Rebels in Mozambique aim to split country. Washington Times [Washington DC] (11 November 1986). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 228 kb. This article in a conservative US daily, which was generally sympathetic to the MNR, makes explicit the idea that the movement was in a position, partly as a result of the earlier «expulsions» from Malawi, to split the country in two by controlling a corridor along the Zambezi river. This did not in fact happen.
The KaNgwane Landmine
and the Location of ANC Bases
In June 1986, faced with escalating internal resistance to apartheid, the South African regime had declared a state of emergency, which included draconian measures to control press reporting of incidents of violence.
Three months later, on 6 October, in the midst of the state of emergency, an SADF vehicle travelling on a dirt road in what is now Mpumalanga, near a not-yet-famous area called Mbuzini, reportedly triggered a landmine. Six soldiers were wounded in the explosion and were medivac’d to the military hospital in Voortrekkerhoogte. Albertina Sisulu was later to voice suspicions that this event had been «stage-managed»; but in any case, it was treated by the apartheid regime as the last straw, and provoked a wave of accusations about the ANC’s supposed military activities based in Mozambique, with outraged demands that the Mozambican government put a halt to them. Within a few days, quite explicitly in retaliation for the explosion, South Africa had halted the recruitment of mine labour from Mozambique, clearly a way of exerting significant financial pressure on an already fragile economy.
But the South African government was not satisfied; in the next days and weeks, and in fact even after the death of Machel on 19 October, threats and warnings couched in belligerent language continued.
Sources on the Landmine Incident and ANC Bases
◊ 7 October 1986
Landmine blast: 6 SADF men hurt. Citizen [Johannesburg] (7 October 1986). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 224 kb. Reports the detonation of a landmine by an SADF vehicle travelling on a dirt road near Nbuzine, KaNgwane, close to the border with Mozambique. Six soldiers were injured. This was ostensibly the precipitating event for the crisis.
◊ 8 October 1986
ANC reaction to South Africa’s deadly threats against Mozambique. Broadcast from Radio Freedom in Addis Ababa on 8 October 1986, and reprinted in the Summary of World Broadcasts [London]. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 142 kb.
◊ 8 October 1986
Anthony Robinson. S. Africa warns Machel of clash. Financial Times [London] (8 October 1986). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 168 kb. Magnus Malan warns Machel that he faces a «head-on clash» if he does not rein in the ANC.
◊ 9 October 1986
S African defence minister wants [sic: warns] Mozambique of reprisals. Summary of World Broadcasts [London] no.ME/8385 (9 October 1986), p.B/1. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 135 kb. After six South African soldiers are injured by a [presumably ANC] landmine in KaNgwane, Magnus Malan is quoted in a SAPA report as saying that ‘it must be clearly put to President Machel that these conditions [cannot] be allowed to go on’.
Above: Magnus Malan (1930-2011) was South Africa’s Minister of Defence in the government of P. W. Botha. His belligerent statements and «warnings» to Mozambique contributed significantly to the raising of tensions during the crisis of October 1986, and to the suspicion of South African involvement in the disaster of Mbuzini.
◊ 9 October 1986
South African allegations of ANC-Mozambique links. SABC radio on 9 October 1986, reported in the Summary of World Broadcasts [London]. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 61 kb.
◊ 9 October 1986
South African radio comments on relations with Mozambique. SABC radio commentary on 9 October 1986, published by Summary of World Broadcasts [London]. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 103 kb. The radio claims that ‘this year there have been at least 23 terrorist attacks in South Africa that were masterminded in Mozambique’ and says that it is ‘imperative’ that counterinsurgency action be ‘taken expeditiously and decisively’.
◊ 10 October 1986
Mozambican comment on reasons for S African destabilisation. An AIM/PANA news release, which describes apartheid as «an ideology approaching madness», dated 10 October 1986, and reprinted in the Summary of World Broadcasts [London]. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 127 kb.
◊ 10 October 1986
South African deputy minister on relations with Mozambique. Summary of World Broadcasts [London] no.ME/8386 (10 October 1986), p.B/2-B/4. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 236 kb. Transcript in English of an Afrikaans television interview with Ron Miller, the deputy minister of foreign affairs of South Africa. Miller says that Malan’s warning was ‘one that had to be given to Mozambique’ and that South Africa is ‘not going to tolerate [ANC activities] in Mozambique’. He also denies ‘categorically’ that South Africa is supporting the MNR.
◊ 13 October 1986
UDF leader blames government for recent explosions. Report dated 13 October 1986 reprinted in the Summary of World Broadcasts [London]. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 42 kb. Albertina Sisulu says that the landmine explosions that injured South African soldiers were «stage-managed» to provide a pretext for threatening Mozambique.
◊ 15 October 1986
Mozambique Resistance leader on increased ANC activity. SABC broadcast on 15 October 1986, transcribed in the Summary of World Broadcasts [London] (15 October 1986). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 39 kb. Senior MNR figure Paulo Oliveira comments on problems with rail traffic in Mozambique and the ANC presence in the country.
◊ 15 October 1986
ANC denies bases. Pretoria News [Pretoria] (15 October 1986). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 97 kb. The ANC denies that it has planned or carried out any operations from Mozambican territory, or that it has anything other than a diplomatic presence in the country.
◊ 18 October 1986
P. W. Botha appeals for unity, says S Africa not seeking war with Mozambique. Summary of World Broadcasts [London] no.ME/8393 (18 October 1986), p.B/1. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 95 kb. The State President says he cannot understand why the country is divided in the battle against communism, and that he hopes that the Nkomati Accord will stand firm even though it is in difficulty.
The Halting of Mine Labour Recruitment
After the KaNgwane landmine incident, the level of threats and warnings from South Africa was ratcheted up. It was not long before the first «retaliatory» step was taken, in what was almost certainly an attempt to divert attention from domestic problems by blaming foreign communist agitation and internationalising the internal struggle against apartheid. Thus, on 8 October 1986 a joint statement was issued by four ministers – Foreign Affairs; Manpower; Mineral and Energy Affairs; and Home Affairs – stating that a note had been sent to the Mozambican government informing it that, with immediate effect, no further recruitment of Mozambican workers would be allowed,
as a result of the activities of the ANC and the South African Communist Party who are responsible for the continuing deteriorating security situation on the common border with the Republic of South Africa.
This was followed by a vigorous press campaign in which Mozambique was accused – with no apparent sense of irony – of having broken the terms of the Nkomati Accord, and in which the Mozambican government was simultaneously represented as having lost control of the country. Both the United States and the European Union expressed disquiet at these developments.
Sources on the Labour Recruitment Ban
◊ 10 October 1986
South African government announces halt to recruitment of Mozambican workers. Summary of World Broadcasts [London] no.ME/8386 (10 October 1986), p.ii. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 51 kb.
◊ 10 October 1986
South African government announces halt to recruitment of Mozambican workers. Summary of World Broadcasts [London] no.ME/8386 (10 October 1986), p.B/1. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 61 kb. The Pretoria government announces a halt to the recruitment of Mozambican labour ‘as a result of the activities of the ANC and the SACP who are responsible for the continuing deteriorating security situation … and who … is [sic] still operating from Mozambique’.
◊ 8 October 1986
Mozambican and other reaction to South African measures. Reports different sources on 8 October 1986, in the Summary of World Broadcasts [London]. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 22 kb.
◊ 8 October 1986
Mozambican reaction to the latest South African blackmail. Radio Mozambique commentary on South Africa’s decision to halt migrant labour as a way of exerting political pressure, broadcast at 19h00 on 8 October 1986 and reported in the Summary of World Broadcasts [London]. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 89 kb.
◊ 9 October 1986
Reprisal. Citizen [Johannesburg] (9 October 1986). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 549 kb. An openly menacing editorial ‘Comment’ arguing that the halting of labour recruitment for the mines is a justified step, and predicting that ‘military action’ is not excluded. If Machel, who has ‘lost control’ of his country, allows a ‘Moscow-inspired revolutionary war’ against South Africa, then he must consider that South Africa ‘does not make threats idly’.
◊ 10 October 1986
Face às ameaças do regime do apartheid, trabalhadores sul-africanos solidários com Moçambique: sindicatos anunciam defesa dos direitos dos trabalhadores moçambicanos. Notícias [Maputo] (10 October 1986). In Portuguese. Click here to download a PDF file, size 259 kb.
◊ 11 October 1986
South African radio accuses Mozambique of undermining Incomati accord. Summary of World Broadcasts [London] no.ME/8387 (11 October 1986), p.B/1. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 100 kb.
◊ 11 October 1986
Further Mozambican reaction to S African recruitment restriction. Summary of World Broadcasts [London] no.ME/8387 (11 October 1986), p.B/1-B/3. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 158 kb.
Above: a cartoon that appeared in the Johannesburg newspaper The Sowetan on 16 October 1986, showing Mozambican refugees fleeing aircraft and artillery bombardment.
◊ 11 October 1986
Further S African comment and Mozambican reaction to recruitment ban. Summary of World Broadcasts [London] no.ME/8387 (11 October 1986), p.ii. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 48 kb.
◊ 11 October 1986
NUM hits at ban. Star [Johannesburg] (11 October 1986). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 106 kb. The National Union of Mineworkers reacts critically to the halting of labour recruitment in Mozambique, saying that it ‘will not be taken lying down’.
◊ 11 October 1986
US expresses regret at recent SA actions. Pretoria News [Pretoria] (11 October 1986). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 123 kb. A State Department spokesperson says that the United States is ‘deeply concerned’ by the deterioration of Mozambican-South African relations, and urges the avoidance of escalation and a return to Nkomati-style dialogue.
◊ 14 October 1986
Recruitment of miners halted in Mozambique. SAPA report dated 14 October 1986, published in the Summary of World Broadcasts [London]. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 52 kb.
◊ 16 October 1986
Mozambican miners recruited before S African ban allowed to work. A SAPA news release dated 16 October 1986, reproduced in the Summary of World Broadcasts [London]. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 75 kb. About 750 mineworkers recruited before the ban but not yet in South Africa will in fact be allowed to enter the country.
◊ 17 October 1986-23 October 1986
Phillip van Niekerk. One frontline: from the townships to Tete. Weekly Mail [Johannesburg] (17 October 1986-23 October 1986), p.6-7. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 175 kb. The article connects South African destabilisation of neighbouring countries to the internal struggle of the regime against its own disenfranchised population.
◊ 17 October 1986
Mozambique-SA relations: the ruins of Nkomati. Financial Mail [Johannesburg] (17 October 1986), p.47. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 252 kb. Says that the ban on mine labour recruitment ‘amounts to abrogation of the Nkomati Accord’, that Malan has been showing ‘unmistakable belligerence’, and that ‘Machel’s ragged regime is in extremis’.
◊ 17 October 1986-23 October 1986
Phillip van Niekerk and Jean Leger. The last train from Maputo: Mozambican labour and the mines. Weekly Mail [Johannesburg] (17 October 1986-23 October 1986), p.13. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 201 kb.
The Threat of Direct South African Military Action
Mozambican fears of the threat of a direct South African intervention were not irrational. First of all, South African political rhetoric at this time, although presumably meant at least partly for domestic consumption, was extremely menacing and direct, far from the anodyne register of normal diplomatic discourse. Second, there were troop movements of a clearly threatening character:
No início do mês, os sul-africanos transferiram um esquadrão de caças-bombardeiros e três esquadrões de helicópteros militares para os aeroportos de Nelspruit e Komatipoort, na fronteira moçambicana. Eles ainda transferiram unidades de reconhecimento, infantaria e carros blindados para Komatipoort na mesma ocasião [‘A guerra e as mudanças sociais recentes em Moçambique, 1986-1992,’ Estudos Afro-Asiáticos no.23, Dezembro de 1992, pág.218].
Third, it was announced that Mozambican intelligence sources had picked up indications that South Africa had infiltrated a commando unit into Maputo and was planning an attack, and militia units were being mobilised all over the city in the first weeks of October. Such an attack would by no means have been unprecedented; memories of the Matola raid in 1980 and other attacks were still fresh, although the Nkomati Accord had supposedly put an end to such aggressive adventurism by the South Africa regime.
Sources on South African Military Preparations
◊ 11 October 1986
Comando sul-africano infiltrado no país, revela Ministro da Segurança, nas celebrações do Dia do SNASP. Notícias [Maputo] (11 October 1986). In Portuguese. Click here to download a PDF file, size 315 kb. Minister Sérgio Vieira announces that South Africa has infiltrated commandos into the country.
◊ 11 October 1986
Mozambique security minister on activities of special units. Transcript of a message from Sérgio Vieira, Minister of Security, regarding the creation of «special operations units» by SNASP; broadcast by Radio Mozambique on 11 October 1986, and published in the Summary of World Broadcasts [London]. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 52 kb.
◊ 11 October 1986
SA commandos in Maputo. Herald [Harare] (11 October 1986). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 21 kb. Col. Sérgio Vieira, minister of security, warns the «people’s vigilance» groups that commandos have been infiltrated into Maputo and are planning criminal acts.
◊ 12 October 1986
Militaristas da RAS preparam agressão directa a Maputo: comunicado do Governo de Moçambique. Domingo [Maputo] (12 October 1986), p.3. In Portuguese. Click here to download a PDF file, size 315 kb. Complete text of the communiqué, which states that South Africa’s «objectivo último [é] de criar condições para derrubar o Governo da República Popular de Moçambique e instalar em Maputo fantoches ao serviço do apartheid».
◊ 13 October 1986
ANC says Pretoria planning to invade Mozambique. Broadcast from Radio Freedom, Addis Ababa, on 13 October 1986, reprinted in the Summary of World Broadcasts [London]. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 137 kb.
◊ 13 October 1986
Keith Abendroth. Mozambique backing ANC activities: Machel equates SA regime with Zionism. Citizen [Johannesburg] (13 October 1986). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 324 kb. A thin piece of editorialising disguised as reporting, the article argues from allegedly under-reported speeches by Machel and Chissano that the Mozambican government is backing the ANC, MK and the SACP ‘to the hilt’.
◊ 13 October 1986
Mozambique warns of direct aggression by S Africa against Maputo. Summary of World Broadcasts [London] no.ME/8388 (13 October 1986), p.B/1-B/3. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 306 kb. Translated text of a Mozambican government communiqué dated 11 October.
◊ 13 October 1986
Mozambique warns of direct aggression by South Africa. Summary of World Broadcasts [London] no.ME/8388 (13 October 1986), p.ii. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 70 kb.
◊ 14 October 1986
ANC’s comment on RSA threat to Mozambique. Summary of World Broadcasts [London] no.ME/8389 (14 October 1986), p.B/2-B/5. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 317 kb. Transcript of a broadcast entitled «Hands off the Frontline States» from Radio Freedom in Addis Ababa on 11 October 1986.
◊ 14 October 1986
Mozambique reportedly tightens security on Swazi border. Broadcast on 14 October 1986 by Capital Radio, Umtata, transcribed in the Summary of World Broadcasts [London]. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 22 kb.
◊ 14 October 1986
Mozambique at war. Argus [Cape Town] (14 October 1986). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 541 kb. An Argus comment identifies the elements of the crisis and argues for quiet diplomacy rather than sabre-rattling.
◊ 16 October 1986
Maputo groups discuss measures against S African attack. Radio Mozambique broadcast on 16 October 1986, printed in the Summary of World Broadcasts [London] (16 October 1986). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 58 kb. City neighbourhoods are preparing defences against an attack, with the women’s organisation, the OMM, also involved.
◊ 16 October 1986
Maputo prepara-se para se defender. Notícias [Maputo] (16 October 1986). In Portuguese. Click here to download a PDF file, size 297 kb.
◊ 17 October 1986-23 October 1986
Patrick Laurence. Avalanche? Or another shower of pebbles? Weekly Mail [Johannesburg] (17 October 1986-23 October 1986). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 146 kb. On South Africa’s overall regional strategy and its failings.
◊ 17 October 1986-23 October 1986
Paul Fauvet. Panic in Maputo? Not that I’ve noticed. Weekly Mail [Johannesburg] (17 October 1986-23 October 1986), p.1, 3. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 554 kb.
◊ 18 October 1986
Protest at SA move on Maputo. Financial Times [London] (18 October 1986). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 36 kb. The government of the United Kingdom and other members of the European Union (at that time twelve in number) express «grave concern» at reports that South Africa is considering military action against Mozambique.
◊ 19 October 1986
Face às ameaças de agressão, milicianos prontos para defender Maputo. Domingo [Maputo] (19 October 1986). In Portuguese. Click here to download a PDF file, size 122 kb.
◊ 19 October 1986
Stephan Terblanche. ANC began push six months after Accord - claim. Sunday Times [Johannesburg] (19 October 1986). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 224 kb. Terblanche quotes intelligence sources as saying that there are several hundred trained ANC fighters in Maputo, and that the city is the main centre for the launching of ‘terrorist’ attacks in South Africa.
◊ 20 October 1986
Na defesa de Maputo, milicianos reafirmam prontidão combativa. Notícias [Maputo] (20 October 1986). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 213 kb.
◊ 20 October 1986
Paul Fauvet. Defiant Maputo belies SA propaganda. Guardian [London] (20 October 1986). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 129 kb. In a piece clearly written before the Mbuzini disaster, but published on the 20th, Fauvet reports that life continues normally in Maputo, despite reports in the South African newspapers.
◊ 20 October 1986
Southern Africa: Mozambique’s peril. West Africa [London] (20 October 1986). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 86 kb.
The Frontline States React to the Crisis
It seems that the strategy developed by the Frontline States of pressuring Banda to abandon the MNR was to have been paralleled by pressure on President Mobutu to abandon his support of Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA in Angola. With the Benguela railway reopened, Zambia’s copper and other exports would have flowed more freely, and South Africa’s attempts to transform the domestic struggle for democracy into a regional struggle against a hypothetical communist onslaught would have been rolled back.
Zaire was represented at the Frontline summit in Maputo in October; and this was followed up with a meeting with Mobutu himeslf in Zambia on the fateful 19 October. The South African press followed these developments with apparent alarm and changing lines of analysis, urging compromise, saying that Mozambique was on the verge of collapse, and saying that the meetings had failed.
Sources on Frontline States Activity
◊ 13 October 1986
Comment on Zaire’s participation in Frontline States’ Maputo summit. An AZAP report dated 13 October 1986 printed in the Summary of World Broadcasts [London]. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 63 kb. The Zairean news agency AZAP comments that the invitation to Zaire to attend the meeting was «a clear sign of the interest and confidence placed in our country by the nations of southern Africa». In fact, however, it was in order to exert pressure for an end to Zairean support for the Angolan movement UNITA, after a similar effort had had some success in limiting Malawian support for Renamo.
◊ 13 October 1986
Frontline leaders’ meeting in Maputo. Summary of World Broadcasts [London] no.ME/8388 (13 October 1986 ), p.ii. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 92 kb.
◊ 13 October 1986
Maputo on war alert. Sowetan [Johannesburg] (13 October 1986). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 340 kb. As the Frontline States meet in Maputo, the country’s security forces remain on high alert in case of an attack by South African commandos or aircraft. A South African government spokesman says that Mozambique is suffering from an attack of nerves, and is in ‘deep waters’.
◊ 13 October 1986
Resolver pacificamente problemas, afirma Samora Machel. Notícias [Maputo] (13 October 1986). In Portuguese. Click here to download a PDF file, size 192 kb. Partial transcript of remarks by Samora Machel to the press corps after the Frontline States meeting, less than a week before his death at Mbuzini.
Above: Mobutu Sese Seko (1930-1997), President of Zaire (1965-1997), with whom the Frontline leaders were meeting in Zambia on 19 October 1986, in an attempt to pressure him into dropping his support for Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA movement.
◊ 15 October 1986
Press conference after Maputo summit: Kaunda on Malawi’s invasion of Mozambique. Summary of World Broadcasts [London] no.ME/8390 (15 October 1986), p.B/1. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 122 kb.
◊ 15 October 1986
S African comment urges compromise in Angola and Mozambique. SABC comment broadcast on 15 October 1986 and printed in the Summary of World Broadcasts [London]. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 37 kb.
◊ 16 October 1986
Face à escalada de agressão da RAS, solidariedade com Moçambique: Samora Machel recebe mensagens. Notícias [Maputo] (16 October 1986). In Portuguese. Click here to download a PDF file, size 107 kb. Messages of support have been received from the OAU and from Algeria.
◊ 16 October 1986
South African comment says Maputo summit failed dismally. Summary of World Broadcasts [London] no.ME/8391 (16 October 1986), p.B/2. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 96 kb. A commentary arguing that the meeting of Frontline States was a failure and blaming South Africa’s neighbours for instability in the southern African region.
◊ 16 October 1986
S African defence minister says Mozambique on brink of collapse. Summary of World Broadcasts [London] no.ME/8391 (16 October 1986), p.B/1. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 101 kb. In an interview, Magnus Malan says inter alia that «the leaders of the so-called Frontline States have not yet received the message», and that they and the ANC «should be aware of the the consequences».
◊ 17 October 1986-23 October 1986
Howard Barrell. A Frontline wrist-slap for Zaire’s Mobutu. Weekly Mail [Johannesburg] (17 October 1986-23 October 1986). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 530 kb. Samora Machel, Kenneth Kaunda and Eduardo dos Santos are due to meet Mobutu Sese Seko in Zambia on Sunday to pressure him into ending support for the Angolan movement UNITA. The leverage exerted will be the fact that much of Zaire’s export trade passes through Zambia and Zimbabwe. This was the meeting that Machel was returning from when his aircraft crashed at Mbuzini inside South Africa on 19 October 1986.