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MBUZINI
The Death of Samora Machel
19 October 1986
Dossier MZ-0017
Commissions and Boards of Inquiry
Altogether, four commissions of inquiry have investigated the Mbuzini disaster. One was Mozambican; one was international and tripartite; one was South African, chaired by Judge Cecil Margo; and one was Soviet, which has gone virtually unreported in the literature. No agreed consensus was ever reached, and this remains a major contributory factor in repeated calls over the years for investigations to be reopened and/or continued.
Above: South African foreign minister Pik Botha arrives at the crash site in Mbuzini, October 1986. His role in the events surrounding the disaster have remained the subject of controversy.
The Mozambican Commission; and Mozambican
Relations with Other Inquiries
The Mozambican Comissão Nacional de Inquerito was established on 23 October 1986, four days after the disaster, by joint decision of the Bureau Político of the Frelimo Central Committee, the Comissão Permanente of the Assembleia Popular, and the Council of Ministers. Its membership of 14 consisted of Armando Guebuza, Jacinto Veloso, Sérgio Vieira, António Hama Thai, Lagos Lidimo, Rui Gomes Lousã, Hipólito Patrício, João Honwana, António Neves, Aníbal Samuel, Agapito Colaço, Paulo Muchanga, Patrício Matimbe, and Carlos Zacarias Pessane. The Comissão Nacional de Inquerito submitted an interim report to the 7th session of the Frelimo Central Committee in August 1987, and was instructed to continue its work. It has never been formally disbanded and a Radio Mozambique broadcast of 27 October 1988 mentioned that, at that time, inquiries were continuing.
Below, some newspaper clippings and articles about the Mozambican Comissão Nacional de Inquerito.
MHN Resources on the Comissão Nacional de Inquérito
◊ 23 October 1986
Comissão Nacional de Inquérito constituída. Notícias [Maputo] (23 October 1986). In Portuguese. Click here to download a PDF file, size 62 kb. The story names the members of the commission. Includes box entitled «Entregues primeiras conclusões médico-legais».
◊ 23 October 1986
Maputo is said to find signs of human error in crash of Machel’s jet. International Herald Tribune [Paris] (23 October 1986). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 82 kb.
◊ 23 October 1986
Portuguese report cites navigational error as likely cause of Machel crash. A broadcast by RTP Lisbon on 23 October 1986; transcribed and translated by Summary of World Broadcasts [London]. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 63 kb.
◊ 24 October 1986
Mozambique commission of inquiry into Machel crash; elections postponed. Summary of World Broadcasts [London] no.ME/8398 (24 October 1986), p.ii. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 33 kb. Radio Mozambique reports that a 14-member Mozambican commission of inquiry has been set up.
◊ 20 January 1987
[AIM telexes]. AIM telex [Maputo] (20 January 1987), p.2 pages. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 82 kb. Two telexes from the Mozambican News Agency (AIM), reporting that Lt.-Gen. Armando Guebuza, then Minister of Transport, had announced Mozambique’s decision not to participate in the Margo hearings, but rather to propose that the tripartite commission continue to investigate the origin of the VOR signal that the aircraft was following when it turned. The second telex is the translated text of the Political Bureau communiqué on the same subject.
◊ 21 January 1987
Mozambican minister on role of radio beacon in crash. Remarks by Armando Guebuza on the possibility of a decoy beacon, reported by Radio Mozambique on 21 January 1987 and printed in the Summary of World Broadcasts [London]. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 16 kb.
◊ 21 January 1987
Queda do avião presidencial: instruções para propor continuação das investigações, comunicado do Bureau Político do Partido Frelimo. Notícias [Maputo] (21 January 1987). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 58 kb. The full text of the communiqué of the Bureau Político on the next steps in the investigation.
The Tripartite Commission
International law governing procedures for the investigation of aircraft accidents were established under the Chicago Convention of 1944, which in 1986 was in its sixth revision. The specific regulations are contained in annex 13 to the convention. A specialised UN agency, ICAO (the International Civil Aviation Organisation), is responsible for the administration of the procedures. South African membership of ICAO had effectively been suspended in 1971, when the body decided not to invite South Africa to meetings. The tripartite commission was constituted as required by these rules and therefore had special status. According to the rules, the «State of Occurrence» (South Africa) was required to work with the «State of Registry» (Mozambique) and the «State of Manufacture» (the Soviet Union) to organise a technical inquiry. This commission produced the required Aircraft Accident Factual Report on 16 January 1987. It includes information from the wreckage of the aircraft, as well as from the flight recorders or black boxes, which contained the cockpit voice recording, which was eventually transcribed after some dispute. The Mozambican journalist the late Carlos Cardoso wrote an important analysis of the transcript in the article ‘Sobre os últimos dez minutos’, published in January 1987; an English version of this text is published in Sarah LeFanu’s S is for Samora (Durban: UKZN Press, 2012) pages 301-307. However, after the completion of the Aircraft Accident Factual Report, the South Africans considered that the tripartite commission had completed its task, and no further collaborative work was done on the question of which VOR the aircraft was following. Sarah LeFanu prints the appendix from the Aircraft Accident Factual Report, the cabin voice transcript, in her book S is for Samora, pages 285-289.
MHN Resources on the Tripartite Commission
◊ 21 October 1986
Nigeria urges international probe. Citizen [Johannesburg] (21 October 1986). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 103 kb. General Babangida urges South Africa ‘to allow’ an international panel to investigate the disaster.
◊ 29 October 1986
S African experts likely to go to Moscow for opening of black-box. An SABC radio report on 29 October 1986 quoting Pik Botha and republished in the Summary of World Broadcasts [London]. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 36 kb. This did not in fact happen, and the question of decoding the black box quickly became a point of contention.
◊ 30 October 1986
S African Foreign Minister on decoding of black boxes. Summary of World Broadcasts [London] no.ME/8403 (30 October 1986), p.B/2. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 81 kb. Pik Botha is quoted in a SAPA dispatch dated 28 October to the effect that South Africa wants the flight recorders decoded anywhere other than Moscow, in order to ensure ‘complete impartiality’.
◊ 30 October 1986
S African forensic expert says Machel died instantaneously. SAPA report dated 30 October 1986 republished in the Summary of World Broadcasts [London]. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 37 kb. The report says that Machel’s body was identified from his uniform and ‘gold teeth’.
◊ 1 November 1986
S Africa says it is waiting for a Soviet response over black box decoding. Summary of World Broadcasts [London] (1 November 1986). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 15 kb. SAPA report dated 1 November 1986 and republished in the Summary of World Broadcasts.
◊ 2 November 1986
Investigation awaited into causes of Mozambican air crash. Translated text of a report from a Soviet television station on 2 November 1986, republished in the Summary of World Broadcasts [London]. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 35 kb. Interestingly, the report is cautious, and refrains ‘from drawing final conclusions’ about the cause of the crash, which might have been caused by bad weather or by sabotage.
The Tripartite Commission in session on 11 November 1986, with representatives from Mozambique, the Soviet Union and South Africa present. There appear to be 14 people seated at the table.
◊ 7 November 1986
Suspicion mounts as SA keeps boxes. Herald [Harare] (7 November 1986). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 560 kb. Gives details of South African delaying tactics in releasing the flight recorders (‘black boxes’) for analysis, suggesting that South African behaviour is only serving to ‘fuel suspicion’ that there was something out of the ordinary about the crash. The article says that South Africa had earlier been ‘expelled’ from ICAO.
◊ 8 November 1986
Despenhamento do avião presidencial: África do Sul recusa-se a entregar caixas negras. Notícias [Maputo] (8 November 1986). In Portuguese. Click here to download a PDF file, size 190 kb.
◊ 9 November 1986
Pretoria keeping black box from crash probe team. Sunday Mail [Harare] (9 November 1986). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 64 kb. Mozambican Minister of Information Teodato Hunguana accuses South Africa of diversionary tactics in refusing to hand over the black boxes for analysis, and in claiming that a document found at the crash site included details of a Mozambican-Zimbabwean plan to topple the Banda government in Malawi.
◊ 9 November 1986
Richard Witkin. Aviation experts visit Mozambique: UN agency officials arrive to help with inquiry into Machel’s plane crash. New York Times [New York] (9 November 1986). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 97 KB. Two accident investigators from ICAO have arrived in Maputo ‘to help the Mozambican government investigate the crash’.
◊ 11 November 1986
Tragédia de Mbuzini: comissão internacional reúne na nossa capital, delegação sul-africana esteve presente. Notícias [Maputo] (11 November 1986). In Portuguese. Click here to download a PDF file, size 247 kb. Names the members of the South African delegation to a meeting of the tripartite commission as: Mr de Klerk, Mr van Zyl, Mr Roy Downes, Mr Jordaan, Major Rochat and Commander Lynch. Soviet and Mozambican participants are not identified.
◊ 12 November 1986
RAS continua a recusar entregar caixas negras. Notícias [Maputo] (12 November 1986). In Portuguese. Click here to download a PDF file, size 45 kb.
◊ 13 November 1986
Caixas negras: RAS levou proposta. Notícias [Maputo] (13 November 1986). In Portuguese. Click here to download a PDF file, size 23 kb. Reports that South Africa has submitted a proposal regarding the decoding of the flight recorders, but does not specify any further details.
◊ 14 November 1986
Mozambican account of proposals for analysis of black boxes. Summary of World Broadcasts [London] no.ME/8416 (14 November 1986), p.ii. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 48 kb. Reports that proposals regarding the decoding of the black boxes have been adopted by the international commission; and that some control tower staff members had been arrested, a report subsequently denied by the Mozambican authorities.
◊ 15 November 1986
Chissano accuses SA of delaying tactics: Maputo wants crash data. Star [Johannesburg] (15 November 1986). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 83 kb. Controversy continues around the question of ‘impartial’ decoding of the various flight recorders.
◊ 15 November 1986
Inquérito à tragédia de Mbuzini: comissão internacional teve nova reunião. Notícias [Maputo] (15 November 1986). In Portuguese. Click here to download a PDF file, size 77 kb. Reports a meeting of the international commission in the Escola de Aeronáutica Civil. The South Africans were led by Piet de Klerk; the meeting was chaired by Paulo Muchanga; ICAO representatives were also present.
◊ 15 November 1986
Pik Botha says Switzerland ready to help decode black box. An SABC radio report on 14 November 1986, printed on 15 November 1986 inSummary of World Broadcasts [London]. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 48 kb. Reports that Pik Botha says that Canada, the US and the UK have all refused to assist with the decoding, but that ‘we cannot hold back forever’.
◊ 16 November 1986
Despenhamento do avião presidencial: comissão de inquérito dá os primeiros passos. Domingo [Maputo] (16 November 1986). In Portuguese. Click here to download a PDF file, size 144 kb. Detailed report on the agreements reached on the decoding of various flight recorders and on control tower communications; the agreement was signed by Mr van Zyl of South Africa, Ivan Dontsov of the Soviet Union, and Paulo Muchanga of Mozambique.
◊ 17 November 1986
Agreement reached on decoding of Machel crash black boxes. AIM report dated 14 November, summarised on 17 November 1986 in the Summary of World Broadcasts [London]. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 30 kb.
◊ 20 November 1986
Air crash team in SA. Guardian [London] (20 November 1986). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 466 kb. Soviet and Mozambican investigators have arrived in South Africa.
◊ 20 November 1986
Tragédia de Mbuzini: comissão de inquérito escuta gravação. Notícias [Maputo] (20 November 1986). In Portuguese. Click here to download a PDF file, size 86 kb. Includes a box «Foi atentado, reafirma piloto soviético», in which survivor Vladimir Novoselov states that he is absolutely convinced that the disaster was an attempt on Machel’s life.
◊ 22 November 1986
3 nations agree on a venue for inquest on Machel crash. New York Times [New York] (22 November 1986). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 144 kb. Annoucement that the recordings from the black boxes will be examined in Zurich, Switzerland.
◊ 23 November 1986
Tragédia de Mbuzini: alcançado acordo para investigação. Tempo [Maputo] no.841 (23 November 1986), p.5. In Portuguese. Click here to download a PDF file, size 83 kb.
◊ 23 November 1986
Tragédia de Mbuzini: comissão de inquérito reúne na Suíça. Domingo [Maputo] (23 November 1986). In Portuguese. Click here to download a PDF file, size 40 kb. The three-nation commission of inquiry will meet in Switzerland on 25 November.
◊ 24 November 1986
Inquérito à tragédia de Mbuzini: comissão parte para Zurique. Notícias [Maputo] (24 November 1986). In Portuguese. Click here to download a PDF file, size 87 kb. Names the Mozambican specialists as Antònio Neves and Carlos Pessane; other members of the commission included João Honwana and Paulo Muchanga. The Soviets were Ivan Dontsov, Vladimir Permiakov and Vladlen Korovkin; ICAO sent B. Caiger and C. Frostell (Finland). Two consultants, Chet Cartwright (US National Transportation Safety Board) and Helmut Kruse (West Germany) also attended at South Africa’s invitation.
◊ 25 November 1986
Arlindo Lopes. Despenhamento do TU-134A: comissão escuta gravação de cabine. Notícias [Maputo] (25 November 1986). In Portuguese. Click here to download a PDF file, size 90 kb.
◊ 26 November 1986
Arlindo Lopes. Inquérito à queda do TU-134A: missão integralmente cumprida em Zurique. Notícias [Maputo] (26 November 1986). In Portuguese. Click here to download a PDF file, size 68 kb. Reports the completion of the process of listening to the cockpit recording, without any technical problems.
◊ 28 November 1986
Queda do TU-134A: comissão de inquérito trabalha em Moscovo. Notícias [Maputo] (28 November 1986). In Portuguese. Click here to download a PDF file, size 38 kb. The members of the tripartite commission have travelled to Moscow to continue their work, decoding the flight recorder’s instrument readings.
◊ 30 November 1986
Iniciada investigação à tragédia de Mbuzini. Tempo [Maputo] no.842 (30 November 1986). In Portuguese. Click here to download a PDF file, size 42 kb.
◊ December 1986
Machel crash in perspective. World Airnews [Durban] vol.14 no.10 (December 1986), p.2-3. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 528 kb. An anonymous technical analysis in a specialist magazine, pointing to pilot error as the likely cause of the disaster.
National representatives from Mozambique, the Soviet Union and South Africa sign the Aircraft accident factual report. In this poor quality newspaper photograph, it appears that Dontsov is on the left of the picture, Muchanga in the centre and van Zyl on the right.
◊ 6 December 1986
Machel crash mystery solved, say experts. Citizen [Johannesburg] (6 December 1986). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 69 kb. Names the South African delegation as consisting of Rennie van Zyl, Pieter de Klerk, J. Inglethorpe, G. West, D. Lynch, R. Downes, W. Staffetius and the US consultant, C. Cartwright. A. W. Kuhn of Foreign Affairs, and an interpreter, Mrs H. Nowack (UNISA). Work will continue between 9 and 16 December in either Komatipoort or Maputo.
◊ 7 December 1986
Descodificação das caixas negras: peritos regressam. Domingo [Maputo] (7 December 1986). In Portuguese. Click here to download a PDF file, size 43 kb.
◊ 13 December 1986
Despenhamento em Mbuzini: peritos voltam a reunir-se em Maputo. Notícias [Maputo] (13 December 1986). In Portuguese. Click here to download a PDF file, size 44 kb.
◊ 16 January 1987
Aircraft accident factual report (16 January 1987), p.1-38. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 3.1 Mb. Produced by the three-country commission, this document consists of a synopsis followed by detailed factual information. On page 5 the report states that a turn to the right was executed, and the pilot commented on it, with the navigator replying, in Russian, ‘VOR indicates that way’. This MHN copy does not include the annexure, which was the transcript of the cockpit conversations translated into English; fortunately, however, a facsimile of the annexure is available in Sarah LeFanu’s book S is for Samora: a lexical biography of Samora Machel and the Mozambican Dream (Durban: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2012), pages 285-299.
The Margo Board of Inquiry (South Africa)
The South African Board of Inquiry into the Accident to Tupolev 134-A Aircraft C9-CAA on 19th October 1986, was chaired by the South African jurist Cecil Margo. At the televised press conference in Komatipoort on 20 October, Foreign Minister Pik Botha remarked:
It is normal practice as you know, in the case of an aircraft crash or accident – the Department of Transport, that is their usual function, automatically investigates the causes of accidents of this nature. So, from the South African government’s point of view, the Minister of Transport already early this morning ordered the normal investigation, and on top of it, I have offered today to the Mozambican authorities to include experts from their side, and the State President indicated that he would welcome experts from the International Civil Aviation Organisation, also to be included in the investigation.
It’s not clear whether this was deliberate or unintentional misdirection, muddling ICAO requirements with South African national practice. In any event, the Margo board is sometimes referred to in South African accounts as the «international» commission of inquiry, but it should not be confused with the tripartite commission constituted according to international regulations. It was «international» only in the sense that it had non-South African members, recruited by Margo, as he admits in his memoirs:
In view of the suspicions published in the South African media that foul play was the cause of the death of President Samora Machel, I decided it would be advisable to assemble a Board composed of internationally-recognised experts in aviation accident investigation who would be beyond any possible criticism for either partiality or prejudice [Final postponement: reminiscences of a crowded life, p.217].
To this end, Margo invited the former US astronaut Frank Borman as well as a senior British judge, Sir Edward Eveleigh and Mr. Geoffrey Wilkinson, a former Chief Inspector of the Accidents Investigation Branch of the British Ministry of Transport to serve on his Board. The other two members were both South Africans: J. J. S. Germishuys and P. van Hoven. There was no Mozambican, ICAO or Soviet representation. The Margo report was submitted to the Minister of Transport Affairs of South Africa on 2 July 1987. It concluded that:
There is no substance in the theory that the aircraft was lured off course by means of a false VOR beacon or any other device ... The cause of the accident was that the flight crew failed to follow procedural requirements ... (page 109).
MHN Resources on the Margo Board of Inquiry
◊ 22 October 1986
Pik Botha invites international participation in Machel crash inquiry. Summary of World Broadcasts [London] no.ME/8396 (22 October 1986), p.B3-B5. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 172 kb. A report of an SABC radio news item, and an English translated transcript of an news conference in Afrikaans and English, broadcast on South African television, about the setting up of a South African commission of inquiry. Botha says that South Africa has invited the Mozambicans to join, and would also welcome ICAO’s participation. This statement is both confused and confusing.
◊ 22 October 1986
Pretoria to investigate Mozambican leader’s crash. New York Times [New York] (22 October 1986), p.A16. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 55 kb. South Africa reacts with extreme swiftness to set up its own inquiry.
◊ 22 October 1986
Alan Cowell. Judge named for inquiry. International Herald Tribune [Paris] (22 October 1986). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 30 kb. Cowell, a New York Times reporter, writes that a South African judge has been appointed to head what he calls ‘the inquiry into the crash’.
Above: A cartoon from Die Burger, 23 October 1986, showing a tearful President Kenneth Kaunda wearing a judge’s wig and saying to members of what appears to be the Tripartite Commission: «Whatever you [sniffle] find out [sniffle] remember that South Africa is guilty!»
◊ 24 October 1986
Much groundwork ahead of main inquiry. Citizen [Johannesburg] (24 October 1986). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 154 kb. The Citizen, describing the Margo commission as ‘the main inquiry’, reports that ‘a delegation of Russian and Mozambican experts’ will fly to the site at Mbuzini ‘today’.
◊ 15 November 1986
Frank Borman adds right stuff to crash probe. Star [Johannesburg] (15 November 1986). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 84 kb. Announces the appointment to the South African ‘Margo inquiry’ of the US astronaut Frank Borman, alongside Sir Edward Everleigh, a senior British judge, and Geoffrey Wilkinson, a retired chief inspector of accidents in the UK Department of Transport.
◊ 9 January 1987
Machel crash probe in SA this month. Herald [Harare] (9 January 1987). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 44 kb. Announced that the South African commission headed by the retired judge Cecil Margo will begin its hearings on 20 January 1987, and that Mozambique and the Soviet Union had been invited to send representatives ‘to call or cross-examine any witnesses or to present any further relevant information’.
◊ 20 January 1987
No alcohol found in pilots of Machel crash. SAPA report dated 20 January 1987, published in theSummary of World Broadcasts [London]. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 36 kb. Renier van Zyl, Director of Aviation Safety, testified to the first day of the Margo Commission hearings to the effect that the Soviet pilots had no alcohol in their blood; the alcohol levels in the blood of the navigator and radio operator were consistent with post-mortem decomposition changes.
◊ 21 January 1987
Audição dos acontecimentos começou na África do Sul. Notícias [Maputo] (21 January 1987). In Portuguese. Click here to download a PDF file, size 71 kb. Report on the opening of the proceedings of the Margo commission of inquiry.
◊ 21 January 1987
Machel crash inquiry opens in South Africa. SAPA report of 21 January 1987, reprinted in theSummary of World Broadcasts [London]. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 22 kb. Quotes comments by the lawyer C. E. Puckrin on the first day of the proceedings: he says that there was no technical failure, no question of sabotage, and that the evidence to be led would ‘dispel the rumours’.
◊ 23 January 1987-29 January 1987
As the music fades. the trouble begins: last moments in the life of the Machel plane. Weekly Mail [Johannesburg] vol.3 no.3 (23 January 1987-29 January 1987). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 677 kb.
Above: Judge Cecil Margo (1915-2000), who presided over the South African national board of inquiry. Margo had been a bomber pilot in the Second World War, and had participated in several other accident investigations.
◊ 23 January 1987-29 January 1987
Jo-Ann Bekker. Machel witness rejects decoy beacon theory. Weekly Mail [Johannesburg] vol.3 no.3 (23 January 1987-29 January 1987), p.1. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 155 kb. Lead story reports testimony of Roy Downes to the Margo hearings. Downes, describing the crew as ‘ill-disciplined’, attributed the disaster to ‘attention fixation’, and claimed the VOR had locked onto Matsapa in Swaziland rather than onto the Maputo beam.
◊ 23 January 1987-29 January 1987
Jo-Ann Bekker. The three riddles of the crash. Weekly Mail [Johannesburg] vol.3 no.3 (23 January 1987-29 January 1987). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 527 kb. The three riddles are: the sudden right turn, the campsite near Mbuzini, and the missing document.
◊ 24 January 1987
Avião presidencial desorientado por um VOR, afirma RAS. Notícias [Maputo] (24 January 1987). In Portuguese. Click here to download a PDF file, size 184 kb.
◊ 24 January 1987
Machel crash crew disorientated by Swazi beacon. SAPA report on Roy Downes’ testimony to the Margo commission, dated 22 January 1987, summarised on 24 January 1987 by the Summary of World Broadcasts [London]. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 30 kb.
◊ 24 January 1987
Machel inquiry discredits false charges. Transcript of an SABC broadcast on 24 January 1987 rejecting ‘scurrilous accusations’ from ‘many quarters’, and stating that these had been ‘thoroughly discredited’ by the Margo board’s proceedings; republished in the Summary of World Broadcasts [London]. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 56 kb.
◊ 27 October 1986-29 October 1986
Air disaster investigated. Beeld and Citizen [composite report] [Johannesburg] (27 October 1986-29 October 1986). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 61 kb. A composite report summarising reports in Afrikaans and English by Gerhard Grobler and Tony Stirling.
◊ 22 January 1987
Machel crash inquiry. Summary of World Broadcasts [London] (22 January 1987). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 37 kb. Reports that Mozambican and Soviet delegates had been ‘repeatedly informed’ that the hearings were starting, thus implying that the South African authorities were unaware of the positions of those delegates regarding the Margo board.
◊ 22 January 1987
Queda do avião presidencial: rádio-ajuda era falsa ou verdadeira? Guebuza afirma que investigação não está concluída. Notícias [Maputo] (22 January 1987). In Portuguese. Click here to download a PDF file, size 104 kb. Armando Guebuza, then Minister of Transport, announces Mozambique’s decision not to participate in the Margo hearings, but rather to propose that the tripartite commission continue to investigate the origin of the VOR signal that the aircraft was following when it turned.
◊ 22 January 1987
Carlos Cardoso. VORs and Samora Machel’s death. AIM telex [Maputo] (22 January 1987), p.1-2. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 103 kb.
◊ 23 January 1987
How Machel died. Times of Swaziland [Mbabane] (23 January 1987). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 21 kb. Testimony of pathologist Louis Nel at the Margo commission.
◊ 23 January 1987
Machel inquiry told of vanishing papers. Herald [Harare] (23 January 1987). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 67 kb. Investigator Pieter de Klerk testifies that a document that was hidden under a table at the crash site had subsequently disappeared; he also conceded that it was possible that there could have been ‘human interference’ with instrument readings at the site.
◊ 23 January 1987
S African account of Machel plane crash. Summary of World Broadcasts [London] no.ME/8473 (23 January 1987), p.ii. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 27 kb. Summarises an SABC commentary which attributes the disaster to a misunderstanding between air traffic control at Maputo and the Soviet crew.
◊ 23 January 1987
Carlos Cardoso. VOR transcript. AIM telex [Maputo] (23 January 1987), p.2 pages. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 80 kb. Reports and comments on some additions and alterations to the transcript of the cabin conversations.
◊ 24 January 1987
Maputo wants further probe into crash signal. Herald [Harare] (24 January 1987). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 149 kb. Quotes Armando Guebuza saying that Frelimo and the Mozambican government want investigations to continue on the question of the VOR that the aircraft was following.
◊ 26 January 1987
Machel crash inquiry: false beacon charge denied. Summary of World Broadcasts [London] no.ME/8475 (26 January 1987), p.ii. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 28 kb. Col. Desmond Lynch refutes claims that a decoy beacon was used by South Africa; Sérgio Vieira states that senior South African officials had told him that they had no interest in documents found in the wreckage of the Tupolev.
◊ 26 January 1987
Mozambican minister on Machel death crash and radio beacon. Summary of World Broadcasts [London] no.ME/8475 (26 January 1987), p.B/10-B/11. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 120 kb. AIM-PANA report on Guebuza’s remarks of 23 January 1987.
◊ 27 January 1987
Despenhamento do avião presidencial: juiz protege Botha na audição, interrogatòrio foi interrompido para evitar pressões públicas ao ministro. Notícias [Maputo] (27 January 1987). In Portuguese. Click here to download a PDF file, size 102 kb. Story claims that Margo interrupted the cross-examination of Pik Botha in order to protect him.
◊ 27 January 1987
Mozambique paper casts doubts on Pik Botha's evidence to inquiry. Radio Mozambique broadcast in Portuguese on 27 January 1987, summarising story in Notícias, republished in English in the Summary of World Broadcasts [London]. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 64 kb.
◊ 27 January 1987
Pik Botha gives evidence to Machel crash inquiry. Summary of World Broadcasts [London] (27 January 1987). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 28 kb. Botha gave evidence on 26 January 1987, claiming that he had taken charge at the scene, against protocol, because of the seriousness of the situation.
◊ 28 January 1987
Machel crash inquiry adjourns to consider evidence. Summary of World Broadcasts [London] (28 January 1987). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 29 kb. States that it could be up to two months before the Margo commission is able to publish its report.
◊ 30 January 1987
New Machel crash facts support beacon theory. Herald [Harare] (30 January 1987). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 160 kb. Claims that some of the data presented to the Margo commission was derived experimentally from a flight simulator; additionally, the flight path after the turn was not towards Swaziland.
◊ 30 January 1987
João Santa Rita. Comissão de inquérito ao acidente de Machel divulga registo de vozes: confusão total entre cabina e torre de Maputo nos minutos que antecederam a queda do avião. Diário de Notícias [Lisbon] (30 January 1987), p.9. In Portuguese. Click here to download a PDF file, size 410 kb.
◊ 31 January 1987
Mozambican and Swazi reports on crash inquiry. Summary of World Broadcasts [London] no.ME/8480 (31 January 1987), p.B/4-B/5. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 105 kb.
◊ 1 February 1987
David Beresford. Critical questions remain about Machel air crash. Guardian [London] (1 February 1987), p.9. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 247 kb. Beresford describes the Margo proceedings as ‘hearings properly constituted under international law’ and criticises Mozambique and the Soviet Union for failing to attend and for allegedly ‘preventing the appearance of apparently key witnesses’. He also reports on the issue of photocopying of documents from the crash site by South African police.
◊ 11 February 1987
Machel crash probe to end soon. Citizen [Johannesburg] (11 February 1987). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 33 kb. The Margo commission is expected to finalise its conclusions within a week, but there is no indication of when the report will be made public.
◊ 15 February 1987
Machel probe has ended. Sunday News [Bulawayo] (15 February 1987). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 31 kb. The Margo commission report is awaiting signatures.
◊ 13 April 1987
Probe into Machel air crash not over. Chronicle [Bulawayo] (13 April 1987). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 729 kb. Despite the completion of the Margo report, President Chissano of Mozambique is quoted as saying that the disaster has not been fully explained.
◊ 2 July 1987
Board of Inquiry into the Accident to Tupolev 134-A Aircraft C9-CAA on 19th October 1986. 2 July 1987, 227 pages, with maps and appendices. Click here to download the complete report from a South African government website, size 2.7 Mb.
◊ 13 July 1987
Government wants Machel death inquiry continued. Foreign Information Broadcast Service [FBIS] [Reston VA] no.FBIS-AFR-87-133 (13 July 1987), p.D4. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 509 kb.
◊ 29 July 1987
Paul Fauvet. Machel crash whitewashed. Guardian [New York] (29 July 1987), p.16. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 478 kb.
◊ 22 August 1987
Tragédia de Mbuzini: rejeitadas conclusões apresentadas pela RAS. Notícias [Maputo] (22 August 1987). In Portuguese. Click here to download a PDF file, size 39 kb. The 7th session of the Frelimo Central Committee formally rejects the Margo report and urges the continuation of investigations into the causes of the disaster.
The Soviet Commission
A very detailed firsthand account of Soviet investigations into the disaster appears as chapter eight of the memoirs of Leonid Seliakov, an engineer and the chief designer of the Tupolev TU-134. The book is entitled Человек, среда, машина: записки авиаконструктора (Moscow: AO ANTK im. A. N. Tupoleva, 1998), 134 pages. The relevant chapter is also available online here [in Russian only].
According to Seliakov, the first group of Soviet investigators consisted of seven members, namely Ivan Vasil’evich Dontsov, Chair of the State Supervisory Commission for Flight Safety (GOSAVIANADZOR); Vladimir Leonidovich Permiakov, a senior engineer; Aleksandr Alekseevich Shiriaev, a flying instructor; Vladimir Aleksandrovich Komarov, a mechanical engineer; Vladlen Ivanovich Korovkin, a representative at ICAO; Leonid Leonidovich Seliakov, the Tupolev’s chief designer; and Leonid Borisovich Uspenskii, a navigation expert. They arrived in Maputo on the morning of 22 October, three days after the disaster, to work in the tripartite commission. Seliakov’s account describes in some detail the negotiations over where the various flight recorders would be decoded. Seliakov returned to Moscow on 20 November 1986.
Above: An official account of Soviet air safety investigation procedures was published in the Flight Safety Digest for January 1992 under the title «Accident and Incident Investigation in Soviet Practice», and can be read here.
On 8 December, however, the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union resolved that investigations should continue into the possibility of the flight having been diverted. This new commission consisted of ten members, five of whom had been in the group that worked in the tripartite commission: V. Ia. Potemkin; I. V. Dontsov; V. I. Rostovtsev; V. S. Kiashko; I. B. Uspenskii; V. L. Permiakov; V. I. Korovkin; V. F. Tokarev; Iu. E. Ustroev; and Seliakov himself, included at the last minute. The commissioners flew to Maputo on 9 December.
The main focal point of the investigation was the navigator’s remark «ВОР туда показывает» [The VOR shows that way], taken to indicate the presence of another beacon. Rostovtsev and Ustroev concentrated on this question; Seliakov specifically mentions the Northrop-Wilcox model 531, weighing 2.250 kg., which could be moved around in a transport plane such as a C-130, by helicopter, or in a trailer towed by a truck.
An article dealing inter alia with the Soviet commission was published in 2001 in the Russian newspaper Kommersant Vlast’, available on-line here [in Russian; no known English or Portuguese translations]. Because the piece is only available in Russian, MHN summarises it in some detail here.
The article, by Evgenii Zhirnov, is headlined «The Crew Was Not Really On Board» and suggests that the initial assumption was that the aircraft had been shot down. Gorbachev reported as much in a Politburo meeting. Both the KGB and the Party’s Central Committee believed that the South African military was the likely culprit. The concern was that, if this could not be proved, since the aircraft was on lease from Aviaexport and was flown by a crew from the Leningrad civil aviation administration, the Soviet Union would be blamed. This line was quickly dropped.
The South African government, according to Zhirnov, refused the Soviet experts permission to visit Mbuzini, and consequently:
«We had to act illegally. We flew over the border in a small plane with a black pilot, and saw everything. There was no indication that there had been a missile, and at first glance there was no sign of sabotage either. The pattern was typical of a plane just hitting the ground».
Above: The safety record of the Tupolev 134 was undistinguished [source: Moscow News 23 June 2011]. The chief designer, Leonid Seliakov, was part of the Soviet team that investigated the accident, and was understandably anxious that it should not be attributed to design flaws. The Tupolev TU-134 had been designed in 1963 with the rear-mounted engines and clean wings that were first introduced by the French company Sud Aviation with their Caravelle aircraft in the 1950s.
After his visit to Mozambique to attend Machel’s funeral, again according to Zhirnov, Geidar Aliev (1923-2003; then a senior Politburo member) reported back on the «false beacon» theory. The Central Committee and the Council of Ministers restructured the commission, but did not disband it: ‘the task was clear: to prove the existence of sabotage and to find out more about the crew’s strange behaviour.’ Zhirnov lists multiple violations of flight rules by the crew: outdated navigational charts, excess weight, refuelling errors, no flight manual, unauthorised communications with controllers, unauthorised course changes by the navigator, and so on. Seliakov’s comment: «It’s true that flying begins where the rules end. Okay, no maps, that’s understandable. They were working abroad, getting paid in foreign currency. If you made a fuss to the boss, you would be sent home double quick. Same thing if you complained about overloading of cargo. But even so, they were fantastically careless. They thought they knew better than the indicators - indicators lie, as the saying goes. So they made mistakes – but apparently there was still a decoy beacon». If the crew had been paying attention, then, the attempt at diversion would not have deceived them.
Zhirnov’s article concludes by alleging that the crew were arguing about how to divide up a crate of Coca Cola that they had received.
MHN Resources and Links on the Soviet Investigations
◊ 14 November 1986
[Transcript of Soviet radio broadcast in English]. Summary of World Broadcasts [London] no.SU/8416 (14 November 1986), p.A5-2. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 118 kb. Report of a press briefing by Ivan Vasin, deputy Minister for Civil Aviation of the Soviet Union.
◊ 2 February 1987
Soviets release new Machel crash evidence. Herald [Harare] (2 February 1987). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 486 kb. Cites a report in the Soviet newspaper Izvestiia (1 February 1987), quoting the Soviet deputy aviation minister, Ivan Vasin as saying that an independent Soviet inquiry had shown that there was ‘no doubt’ that the crash had been caused by an act of subversion.
◊ 9 February 1987
B. Piliatskin. Aviation ministry official reports Soviet analysis of Machel crash. Summary of World Broadcasts [London] no.SU/8487/A5 (9 February 1987), p.1-3. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 240 kb. Translation of the interview with Ivan Vasin published in Izvestiia, morning edition, 1 February 1987, arguing for an act of sabotage as the cause of the disaster.
◊ 22 May 1987-28 May 1987
USSR rejects SA’s Machel crash report. Weekly Mail [Johannesburg] (22 May 1987-28 May 1987). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 38 kb. Ivan Vasin calls for the resumption of tripartite investigations into the cause of the crash, and rejects the Margo findings.
◊ 14 July 1987
Soviets deny RSA findings on Machel plane crash. Foreign Information Broadcast Service [FBIS] [Reston VA] no.FBIS-AFR-87-134 (14 July 1987), p.D2. In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 1.5 Mb.
◊ 17 July 1987
SA crash report rejected. Africa Economic Digest [London] (17 July 1987). In English. Click here to download a PDF file, size 490 kb. Mozambique and the Soviet Union have rejected the findings of the Margo commission.
◊ 14 October 2009
Gibel’ prezidenta Samory Mashela [The death of President Samora Machel], 14 October 2009. Available here [Russian text only]; includes some remarks attributed to the sole Soviet survivor of the crash, Vladimir Novoselov.
The outcome of all this activity has been, in the absence of any completed tripartite commission report other than the factual one, and without any Mozambican report at all, that the report of the Margo board of inquiry has effectively become the report on the disaster. In addition, the Margo board’s dismissal of any consideration of the false beacon issue without further investigation has resulted in what is essentially an either/or representation of the causes of the disaster – either the pilots were incompetent, or there was a false beacon. But these are not mutually exclusive alternatives, and the mustering of evidence about the abilities of the aircrew does not at all exclude the possibility that there was interference of some kind.