

Southern African States and ANC Condemn Incomati Accord

(a) Maputo home service in Portuguese (i) 1030 gmt 15 Mar 85 and (ii) 0504 gmt 16 Mar 85

(i) Text of report:

The first anniversary of the signing of the Incomati accord will be marked tomorrow amid an atmosphere of internal, regional and worldwide expectation because acts of violence and terrorism against Mozambique continue to take place from South Africa in violation of the accord.

In its two-page editorial, the weekly magazine 'Tempo' regrets the unintelligible fact that the South African Government does not see to the full compliance of article three of the Incomati accord and also the declaration read by President Pieter Botha on 3rd October 1984. The 'Tempo' editorial stresses that the number of people murdered, vehicles damaged, trains attacked and power lines sabotaged is very high. Moreover, it has become abundantly clear that there are attempts to provoke a terrorist escalation, mainly around the Mozambican cities. In addition, since the signing of the Incomati accord there have been confirmed cases of infiltration of armed bandits in Niassa and Cabo Delgado provinces, and throughout the country foreign nationals are regarded as military targets, as stated by the Lisbon-based bandit spokesmen.

In its last column, the 'Tempo' editorial adds that now, more than ever before, it has become clear that the gun is the only appropriate answer to armed banditry. The editorial hails the destructive actions of our army, the FPLM, against the bandits in that it is the only language understood by those who see a sign of weakness when one talks of peace. This week's 'Tempo' editorial adds that South Africa is among those who regard dialogue aimed at peace as a sign of weakness.

(u) Excerpts from commentary:

... As has been clear to the whole world and has been stressed in the recent meetings of the frontline states and the five Portuguese-speaking African countries, Mozambique has scrupulously implemented that which it pledged to do by President Samora Machel's signature [on the Incomati accord]. Pieter Botha's signature has not been equally honoured. When it was reasonable to expect the dismantling of training camps of armed bandits inside South Africa, it is known that these camps were not dismantled. ... We have information of daily incursions by bandits who from their camps enter Mozambique to commit the most inhuman crimes, after which they return to safety behind the South African border.

During this year, on various occasions South African leaders have publicly made statements saying that they wish to implement the accord. As we have clear evidence that the accord is not being implemented, we have the following doubt: The South African Government does not want to implement the accord that it signed or, if it does, it lacks the political resolve to do so.

(b) Gaborone home service in English 1110 gmt 15 Mar 85

Excerpts from commentary:

The simmering differences between Mozambique and South Africa on the Incomati accord were high on the agenda of leaders of frontline states in Lusaka, Zambia, last Friday [8th March]. When Mozambique and South Africa signed the controversial peace accord on the banks of the Incomati river on 16th March 1984, many African leaders were sceptical but were quick to appreciate the dilemma facing present-day Mozambique. The fear in some quarters in Africa and beyond was that the signing of a non-aggression pact would compromise Mozambique's commitment to the liberation struggle and thereby slow the momentum of opposition to the apartheid system. But many African leaders were prepared to give the accord the benefit of the doubt. ...

There was no doubt in the minds of many people that Mozambique had had more than its fair share of political violence since its independence. ... But now, a year after Incomati, the situation is no better than it was in March 1984. In fact, it is generally believed that Mozambique is facing a more formidable military pressure than it was a year ago. The opponents of the Government appear to be updated with military supplies and opinion in Mozambique is hardening against South Africa.

Mozambican leaders, including President Samora Machel, Foreign Minister Joaquim Chissano and the country's chief negotiator with South Africa, Maj-Gen Jacinto Veloso, put the blame squarely on South Africa for the escalation of banditry. They are convinced that one way or another, South Africa is cheating.

Recently, Mr Machel told African diplomats in Zambia that he believed the Incomati accord was a failure. The current anxiety in Mozambique is illustrated by a flood of diplomatic activity. Within the last two months, President Machel has met two African leaders in addition to briefing a summit of the frontline states. The Incomati accord dominated the Sao Tome summit of Portuguese-speaking Africa in mid-February. Yet, there appears to be no end to the violence spearheaded by the Mozambique Resistance Movement [MNR].

Observers believe that, having pushed Mozambique so far, South Africa is convinced that Maputo is capable of paying a bigger price for peace. AIM [Mozambique Information

Agency] says feeling is high both in official and unofficial circles that South Africa has not respected the accord because it saw it as a mere tactic - a first step in a grand plan, the goal of which is to force Mozambique to accept power-sharing with the MNR.

It will be added that South Africa could be keen to subdue Mozambique so that it would abandon its political philosophy. Yet, in agreeing to sign the accord, Mozambique sacrificed some of its dearest principles. It has earned the wrath of not only the ANC but other forces within Africa including some of its friends in the OAU. Some have actually accused [it of] capitulation.

The ball is now in South Africa's court. It must arrest Mozambique's diminishing confidence in Incomati by living up to its protestation of good intentions. AIM sums up the mood in Mozambique in this way: The pretoria regime has shown that it is not a serious partner in an agreement of this nature.

(c) Maseru home service in English 1600 gmt 14 Mar 85

Excerpts from commentary:

... It says much ... [that on the anniversary at Incomati both parties] show none of the fanfare that accompanied the attachment of the signatures ... to an agreement that was enthusiastically heralded to usher a new era of peace in southern Africa by the white spokesmen of South Africa.

Their claims were treated at the time with some scepticism in knowledgeable circles in Lesotho; tempered, hopeful attitudes among South Africa's friends in the Western camp; and outright ridicule by most of Africa. The immediate outcome of the Incomati events was untold pressures on Lesotho and Botswana to follow suit and sign similarly worded security pacts with Pretoria.

Lesotho, for its part, made it abundantly clear that it could find no basis for such an agreement with South Africa and that existing arrangements between the two countries were adequate and had advanced mutual interests within the framework of satisfactory neighbourly relations. Botswana took a similar view. . .

With regard to the Incomati accord, the view of [the Lesotho] Government has always been clear. Government declared within the councils of the OAU, on whose agenda the issue has frequently been inscribed, that it did not consider it within its competence to pass judgment on bilateral matters between Mozambique and South Africa, and that, in any event, Lesotho sincerely hoped that the sister state of Mozambique would derive benefit from the interests that motivated it to sign the accord. The view did not preclude Government's clear perception that Lesotho's interests would be affected, as later events proved on the issue of Lesotho's transit corridors.

It is instructive to take a close look at the Incomati accord. It has a total of 11 articles. Of the main operative articles, the provisions of article 1, article 2, article 5 and article 9 are the most significant. In these articles, commitments are spelled out on non-interference in internal affairs, avoidance of land, sea and air attacks on each other, acts of sabotage, unwarranted concentration of forces in areas contiguous to international boundaries, assistance to armed forces of other states and, in article 3, (?referred to) specific actions by other states, governments, foreign military forces, organisations, individuals who plan or prepare what are described as acts of violence, terrorism and aggression.

The article prohibits the organisation on each other's territory of irregular forces or armed bands, including mercenaries, the elimination of their training bases, places of shelter, accommodation, armaments depots, command posts, communication facilities, radio installations, broadcasting stations and clandestine or unofficial broadcasts. In article 5, the two parties further commit themselves to prohibit within their territories of acts of propaganda and, article 9, the establishment of a Joint Security Commission.

In recent months, the leader of Mozambique, President Samora Machel, has repeatedly accused South Africa of bad faith and of non-respect of its commitments to the Incomati accord. It would appear that South Africa's behaviour, in terms of article 3, is the main bone of contention.

The following excerpt from an article written by Paul Fauvet and the Director of AIM, the Mozambique news agency, Carlos Cordoso, sheds illuminating light on the complaint of Mozambique. They state much of the continued banditry in Mozambique is due to the growing number of violations of the Incomati accord from South African soil. Inside Mozambique the belief is growing both in official and unofficial circles that South Africa has not respected the accord because it saw it as a mere tactic, a first step in a [word indistinct] plan, the goal of which was to force Mozambique to accept power-sharing with the MNR [Mozambique National Resistance] bandits.

The two writers also have said that the recent Pretoria commitment to clamp down on the MNR activities is now being interpreted in Mozambique as an attempt by Pretoria to pull the wool over the eyes of international public opinion by creating a false image for the impending political agreement between Mozambique and the bandits. They also say that the Mozambican authorities had little confidence in the South African Government during the 1982-83 negotiations that finally led to Incomati. The South African Government's behaviour after Incomati can only lead to a hardening of this mistrust on the part of the Mozambican Government. The Pretoria regime has shown that it is not a serious partner in an agreement of this nature, the two disillusioned writers conclude.

Writing in the South African 'Rand Daily Mail' of 12th March on what he sees as some aspects of the gloomy commentary on the Incomati accord, Benjamin Pogrund says that only the brave or the foolish now drive outside Mozambique's cities without armed escorts. A danger of ambush and death at the hands of the MNR has become too great.

This then is the situation a bare 12 months after the signing of the security accord. . . Maputo now claims that the accord was nothing but a South African charade to create opportunities for the accommodation of what it says are South African-based and South African supported terrorists, the MNR. . . If there is substance to Mozambique's claims that MNR operate from South African soil, is organised from its territory, and is receiving military hardware from allies in South Africa, then there is sufficient reason for the current bitterness by Mozambicans about Incomati. For the people of Mozambique the agreement is quite clearly a still-born child, and even more clearly there is no reason for celebration.

Those politicians in Lesotho whose voices were screaming in favour of an Incomati-type of accord should pause and reflect deeply about where they really wanted to lead this nation. The first anniversary of Incomati should be a salutary lesson to all Basotho. They should know that in the styles of men truly great, beneath the ink of signatures of agreements should lie concords of minds and not charades.

(d) Lusaka, Radio Freedom in English 1700 gmt 14 Mar 85

Excerpts from commentary:

With the signing of the [word indistinct] so-called peace accord at Incomati last March between the apartheid regime in Pretoria and the People's Republic of Mozambique, the ANC in a [word indistinct] clear statement pointed out that the pact was a one-sided issue which will never work, that it was aimed at turning Mozambique into a (?client) state of apartheid South Africa. Just recently, or to be more precise last Friday, 8th March, a meeting of frontline heads of states held in Lusaka, Zambia, bitterly acknowledged this grim fact. . .

To try to save the already crumbling, dirty face of Incomati, the apartheid regime in Pretoria has hastily dispatched its generals for talks with the Mozambican Government. As usual the regime's generals, masquerading as peace brokers, paraded their dirty faces in front of the Mozambicans claiming to be bringing a gospel message of peace,

cooperation, stability and development. But what has been happening in the last 12 months? Haven't the people of Mozambique suffered in the face of the racist-backed counter-revolutionary bandits known as MNR? From the regime's point of view Mozambicans are like black South Africans, incapable of managing their own affairs.

The apartheid system in South Africa is a colonial system. Its fundamental mentality is based on domination... The visit to Mozambique by the apartheid regime's representatives... was not undertaken in the interests of the struggling people of Mozambique, but to save the already crumbling interests of facism and racist domination. To our people and the people of the subcontinent the saying Once bitten twice shy, should be noted and underlined with great care.

The apartheid regime has never ever been serious or committed in its undertakings. Its bloody history of repression and domination, its [word indistinct] empty promises which were never fulfilled right up to this day of the [word indistinct]. Mozambique then has come as no exception. What now remains for Mozambique, however, it what course of action it will take. That action, in our opinion, is for the people of the Republic of Mozambique to like never before close ranks and entrench [words indistinct] in the face of revolution. The apartheid regime in Pretoria is no ally and will never be one. Like cancer it should be isolated and destroyed for it is a source of anger and tension in the region.