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**THE FIGHT GOES ON:**

**RENAMO**

**Anti-communist Insurgents in Mozambique**

**By Sibyl Cline**

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AUTHOR'S NOTE

I have visited Mozambique three times. In the summer of 1987 I travelled to southern Africa under the auspices of the Global Strategy Council. I spent nearly two weeks in government-controlled Mozambique, meeting with President ~~Joacim~~ Chissano and many of his ~~Ministers~~, and travelling around the country under government protection. I stayed in Maputo, the capital, and visited the cities of Tete and Manjacaze, and the refugee camps at Moatize and <sup>in</sup> the Estima Valley. At Manjacaze I toured the site of an alleged massacre of civilians by RENAMO. On that same trip I walked illegally across the border of Mozambique from a neighboring country, and spent one day visiting with representatives of RENAMO.

In the fall of 1988, I returned to Mozambique with Robert MacKenzie, Executive Director of Freedom Inc., on a mission to secure the release of Nicholas della Casa, a British journalist who was being held by RENAMO on suspicion of being a spy. On that occasion I also spent only one day in RENAMO-controlled territory, but I had the opportunity to meet RENAMO's President, Afonso Dhlakama, who released Nicholas to our group.

In the spring of 1989, President Dhlakama invited Robert MacKenzie, me, and Nicholas to return to RENAMO territory to meet

at more length with him. We accepted <sup>ly</sup> and in May entered "free Mozambique" <sup>ly</sup>. We walked 150 miles or so to Gorongosa, President Dhlakama's headquarters, and then walked back by a different route. We spent 24 days in all <sup>ly</sup> and saw a good deal of RENAMO-controlled territory. The following report is a compilation of what I have learned in those three visits.

## WHO ARE RENAMO?

### 1. Their History

RENAMO are the democratic Mozambican resistance guerrilla forces fighting against the Marxist-Leninist government of President Joaquim Chissano in Mozambique, a country twice the size of California <sup>ly</sup>. Mozambique has South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, and Tanzania as neighbors <sup>on</sup> to the north, south, and west, and the Indian Ocean on the east. The ruling Frelimo party has been in power in Maputo, the capital of Mozambique, since 1975 when Portugal abruptly abandoned her colony. There were no elections. The Portuguese merely handed the government over to Frelimo, who had been waging an anti-colonialist war against them. Most of the Portuguese then left the country. Frelimo <sup>assumed</sup> ~~took~~ the reins of power <sup>ly</sup> and then <sup>made</sup> ~~took~~ a hard turn to the Left, instituting a Marxist government and economic system.

The Frelimo government has not been very successful in bringing peace and prosperity to Mozambique. Very soon after they took power, Frelimo collectivized the farms, relocated many citizens, abolished the churches, and tried to establish a

centralized national economy. The results were poverty, the continuation of ignorance, dislocation, disease, and a devastating civil war. In a country of nearly 15 million people, the government counts only 279 doctors and 12,270 hospital or "rural hospital" beds. <sup>1/</sup> The illiteracy rate is 86%. <sup>percent</sup> The population growth rate is 2.6% <sup>percent</sup> per year, while life expectancy is only 43 years, and the infant mortality rate is a staggering 37.5%. <sup>percent</sup> Mozambique is the fourth poorest country in the world, with a GNP per capita of US\$270 in 1980, the last year for which statistics are available. [In contrast, South Africa is 7.5 times richer, the United States 65 times.] In 1988, foreign debt servicing reached 120% <sup>percent</sup> of Mozambique's total export earnings, and the currency has been devalued 1000% <sup>percent</sup> since 1987. Inefficiency and the ongoing war with RENAMO have virtually wrecked the economy. In 1985 cashew nut production was 1/36th what it was in 1973, corn production was 1/2, bananas and cotton were 1/4, electricity 1/7, and revenues from tourism 1/300th. There are 650,000 refugees in Malawi alone, more than 2 million people have been driven from their homes, and 6 million face chronic food shortages. The major cities experience frequent and lengthy power shortages, there is no electricity in the countryside, and no reliable rail or road transportation anywhere in Mozambique. The country is a shambles. In the past Chissano received significant help from the Soviets <sup>union</sup> and the East bloc. By some estimates, Mozambique owes \$4.3 billion to the Soviets, and <sup>it</sup> is dependent upon them for 90% <sup>percent</sup> of its oil. Recently aid has been

pouring in from Western nations including the <sup>United States</sup> (US), Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy, and also some from South Africa.

RENAMO was formed in 1978 by Mozambicans, many ex-Frelimo members, who were alarmed and dissatisfied with Frelimo's swing toward Marxism after the withdrawal of the Portuguese. With some assistance from the Rhodesian Special Air Service, approximately 800 men were under arms by 1979 when Afonso Dhlakama became their leader. After Rhodesia became Zimbabwe in 1980, South Africa gave some military supplies, training, and communications support to the anti-communist rebels. In 1984, however, South Africa and Mozambique signed the Nkomati Accord, and South Africa stopped its support. There have, however, been persistent rumors of continued South African aid.

From its modest beginnings, RENAMO has grown to 25,000 ✓ members.<sup>2/</sup> Twenty-one thousand have arms, and the rest are in training, waiting until RENAMO can capture enough weapons to supply them as well. The 25,000 figure includes support personnel, since all support personnel are also combatants. RENAMO hopes to increase the number of its fighting men, but at present they place more emphasis on improving the quality of their soldiers. They are developing and training special semi-conventional battalions, and at the moment have 13 such units. There are 6 in the central area around Gorongosa, 2 in Maputo province, 2 in Zambezia, and Nampula, Inhambane and Niassa provinces each have one. In contrast, Frelimo has between 30,000 and 40,000 troops, buttressed by approximately 15,000 foreign

troops, mainly Zimbabwean, Malawian, and Tanzanian. (The Tanzanians were reported to have pulled out their troops this year, but President Dhlakama asserted that not all of them have gone.) There are also several thousand military advisers, mostly East bloc.

## 2. A Military Description

In my recent visit I saw no evidence of any material or equipment from South Africa, and certainly there is no significant amount of assistance coming in. The RENAMO soldiers have an adequate supply of weapons, but they are of all different sorts, many of them composites made out of several different guns, and few of them new. They have few uniforms, mostly ragged clothing, and fewer boots. Many of the soldiers are barefoot. They claim that they capture all of their supplies, and from the look of it, this is believable. While I was in Johannesburg in May on my way to Mozambique, I interviewed a senior South African army officer and he corroborated these observations. He said that, since the signing of the Nkomati Accord, there has been no official aid to RENAMO, that Frelimo uses the rumors of continued aid as an excuse for their own ineptness and as a way to explain away the popular support for RENAMO. He allowed, however, that there may be some illegal private support.

RENAMO's soldiers are either guerrillas or members of the semi-conventional battalions. The guerrillas are lightly armed, sparsely equipped, and, as I mentioned earlier, they are poorly

clothed and shod. Members of the battalions are slightly better clothed and equipped and the battalions have support companies with a variety of heavy weapons. We visited the Lion Battalion in May and they had eight 14.5mm anti-aircraft guns, a 122 mm rocket launcher, a Russian AGS-17 30 mm grenade launcher, a B 10 recoilless rifle, and 82 mm mortars. In addition, the infantry companies were well armed with RPD and FKM machine guns, and RPG 7 rocket launchers. Other battalions are reported to have 12.7 mm machine guns instead of 14.5s, and a similar variety of other heavy weapons.

RENAMO has a well organized HF radio net. During one sched we heard up to 15 stations on the air. VHF communications are non-existent. Some messages are still carried by foot or by motorcycle-bourne courier.

On-going training programs in communications, tactics, first aid, demolitions, and weapon handling are part of the daily routine of battalions not engaged in combat. RENAMO uses its women members as instructors in most subjects, thereby releasing males for combat duty.

Without exception, RENAMO members, whom we saw, displayed very high morale and confidence in their eventual victory. They were all loyal to President Dhlakama. They regarded Frelimo's counter-insurgency efforts as somewhat farcical, and Zimbabwean efforts as only slightly more serious.

The respective conditions of the two forces is most often shrouded by a lack of information on RENAMO, and a barrage of



propaganda from Frelimo. In 1987, however, a top secret report done by the Zimbabwean Central Intelligence Organization leaked to the public domain. It states:

...34. FFLM (Frelimo's armed forces)

Operations of the above is (sic) curtailed by many factors, amongst them the following:

- a) Lack of the will to engage the enemy by the army personnel who generally feel they have already lost the war.
- b) Lack of back-up resources e.g. food, footwear, uniform, cleaning kit, pay, etc.
- c) Lack of proper administrative procedure, motivation, and command.
- d) Sympathy with the enemy...

35. Enemy Advantage:

- a) The enemy enjoys maximum support from the masses whose basic needs could not be satisfied by Frelimo Government. The masses have no choice but to support RENAMO if they are to remain alive in zones under RENAMO control.
- b) The enemy has favorable terrain for its survival in all areas...
- c) By virtue of RENAMO control of all forests...
- d) Enemy morale is generally high when compared to that of FFLM...
- e) Use of mine warfare and the under development of Mozambique territory as a whole.
- f) ...the masses...are now subverted further into seeing RENAMO as their means of survival.<sup>3/</sup>

This is the assessment of an ally and supporter of Frelimo, not intended for public consumption.

When I toured Mozambique under government auspices in 1987, it was painfully obvious that Frelimo's hold on the country was tenuous. Everywhere we travelled we were accompanied by truckloads of well armed soldiers, and even despite them, we fled for the cities at night. One evening I was remarking on the beauties of the sunset near Tete, a small city in the north, when I observed that my host was removing all of the government insignia from the car and hustling me into it with a palish look to his cheeks. We sped toward the town in the increasing gloom.

This precipitous haste was topped the following week as we jounced through the dusk down a dirt road in a land rover, exceeding speeds of 60 mph, heading for the town of Xai-Xai. Obviously RENAMO rules the night. One wonders how the term "government" can apply to a group that cannot stay out after dark in its own country.

### 3. RENAMO's Goals

President Dhlakama maintains that he has already won the war. Using classic guerrilla tactics, he has wrested control of almost all of the countryside from Frelimo, and isolated them in Maputo and the other major cities. On my last trip, he offered to take me on a walk from Gorongosa in the center of the country to within seven kilometers of Maputo, way in the south, travelling in the daytime through territory entirely held by RENAMO. I was sorry (sort of) that I didn't have the time to walk that far, and regretted that RENAMO has no other means of transportation. (Actually, walking the 150 miles down to meet the President, I had harbored those regrets before.) RENAMO is in both phase two and phase three of insurgent warfare. In most of the country they are in phase two of continuing guerrilla activity and politicization of the masses. The 13 battalions, however, represent a move into phase three.

RENAMO has neither the capability nor the desire to take the

cities. Their goal, rather, is to force Frelimo to make political changes toward a democratic system of government. When a guarantee of change happens, they will stop the war. Specifically, President Dhlakama wants a pluralist political system, with free market economics and free and fair elections. He calls Frelimo "his brothers" and wants to take his place by their side in a Mozambican government with two or more parties. To date, Frelimo will not do more than offer amnesty to RENAMO. Even though he is prepared to stay and fight from the bush for ten more years, President Dhlakama expressed the hope that Frelimo's increasing economic and political woes will force them to negotiate soon. Dhlakama wants the destruction of his country to end.

#### BRITISH, UNITED STATES, AND SOUTH AFRICAN POLICIES TOWARD RENAMO

##### 1. The British

I met with the British Ambassador while I was in Maputo in 1987. He was a small man who described himself as a "humble scribe sitting in his own cubbyhole in a dangerous world." He was balding, had pale eyebrows, and wore a violently pink striped shirt. A fluid talker, he was perfectly capable of saying "Pretoria" with no recognizable vowels. He was definitely a world-weary sophisticate, leaving fervid, idealistic opinions to us Americans. He said that the British did not have high hopes for that part of Africa, that the prognosis was not happy, but

that there were pockets of hopefulness. He thought we needed to deal in realpolitik, not idealism. Besides, he said, the Mozambican government was moving towards non-alignment.

Reading between the lines, I decided that "realpolitik" meant two things to the British. First, the survival of Zimbabwe, their ex-colony, and second, the preservation of established British economic interests. Zimbabwe is a British work of art which rose, like a bedraggled phoenix from the ashes of Rhodesia. The British invested a good deal of national prestige and honor in the creation of Zimbabwe during the Lancaster House negotiations. They use their support for Mugabe, Zimbabwe's black African socialist leader, to buy themselves good will among the other black "Front-line" African states. Mugabe supports Chissano, his fellow black African socialist, and loathes RENAMO, who provided the Rhodesians with some intelligence on the movements of Mugabe's ZANU guerrillas during the war. Mugabe does not want a democratic, Western oriented Mozambique, he wants a socialist Mozambique which is friendly towards him and his socialist state. Zimbabwe needs a friendly Mozambique. They rely on access to the Beira Corridor to ship their goods to the sea, without it they would have to use South African transportation which is both distasteful and expensive for Mugabe. According to the Washington Post, the Beira Corridor saved Mugabe \$35 million in lower freight bills last year.4 Economically troubled Zimbabwe needs these savings. RENAMO has on many occasions blown up the Beira railroad and pipeline, and

this does not sit well with Mugabe.

The British have invested more than their national prestige in Zimbabwe. A large portion of the economic interests in Zimbabwe are British, and they also have significant economic interest in Chissano's Mozambique. Lonrho, a London-based conglomerate run by Mr. Tiny Rowland, is the largest employer in Zimbabwe, and just under half of Lonrho's 200.2 million pounds profit in 1987 came from southern Africa. Lonrho is one of the few foreign companies operating in Mozambique. Most investors are frightened off by the "security situation", a gentle way of expressing that they are afraid of being blown up by RENAMO. Lonrho, however, has its own security forces and has cut a deal with the government which is extremely preferential. I interviewed John Hewlett, a Lonrho representative, on August 7, 1987 while I was in Maputo. He told me that for ten years they are tax and duty free; their employees pay no taxes; they have an external bank account and control all the foreign exchange they earn. So, the British have an interest in maintaining the status quo. Mugabe presides in Zimbabwe, and they don't want to upset him unnecessarily. They have economic interests to protect. Their business deals have already been cut, so why rock the boat? Besides, Chissano is a known entity and RENAMO is not. Support for RENAMO does not make you popular in most black African nations. So, sticking with Chissano is the sensible, conservative thing to do.

## 2. The United States

American policy toward Mozambique is even more Byzantine. The Reagan Doctrine called for support for Freedom Fighters the world over, but no support was ever given to RENAMO. Why? Because the State Department has been calling the shots, and has two reasons for wanting to deny RENAMO Freedom Fighter status. The first concerns US policy toward South Africa. The US has been distancing itself from South Africa in order to force the pace of social change in that country, and to mollify a group of American Congressmen who, flinging logic to the winds, equate civil rights experiences in the US with the apartheid situation in South Africa. They stir up the liberal fervor of their constituencies and get themselves re-elected by South Africa bashing--a marvelously cheap and effective shot. They get a lot of opportunities to posture, and are not held responsible for getting results. In their minds and in the opinion of the State Department, the US cannot support RENAMO because RENAMO was at one time supported by the South Africans, and so have been forever tarnished and tainted by that touch. (Never mind that Savimbi has always been supported by the South Africans. That's different. Besides, elements in the State Department didn't want to support Savimbi either. He, however, had good PR and was accorded Freedom Fighter status, so he slipped out of control. Recently the State Department has been busy rectifying that error.)

The second reason is that RENAMO do not fit into the State

Department's grand plan for southern Africa. For the past few years, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester Crocker, has been promoting his policy of "Constructive Engagement." The basic tenet of "Constructive Engagement" is that it is possible to "wean Marxist countries away from socialism" and bring them, repentant, into the Western camp. This policy suits the State Department which is an institution geared toward diplomacy with existing governments, not conflict, and wedded to the status quo as opposed to possibly upsetting unknowns. Crocker invested a good deal of his personal prestige in the success of this approach. It could be argued that his policy has had some effect. On June 3, 1989 the Washington Post reported that the Soviets had promised to take their military advisers out of Mozambique by 1991.<sup>5</sup> This is undoubtedly a step in the right direction. However, the Soviets are cutting their losses all over the world, particularly in Africa, because of pressing economic reasons at home. Just because they cannot afford Chissano any more does not mean that he is not a Marxist. Also, this agreement does not even mention the huge Soviet air and naval base at Nacala, Mozambique, nor does it include the Cuban and East German presence in that country. There are persistent rumors that Cubans are being sent from Angola to Mozambique, instead of being sent home as agreed. It seems to me that, even if you can "wean" a hog away from a drying up tit, it still remains a hog, and you have gained only a bottle fed pig. These are the politics of expediency, not principles. It is a

shame that sophisticated, cynical thinking, which tells us that the best we can expect are half measures, leads us to ignore those who espouse our beloved democratic principles in favor of Marxists who promise to be a little more liberal in return for a whole bunch of money.

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Chester Crocker pursued his vision for eight long years. Whatever the merits of "Constructive Engagement", he followed his course with a sometimes excessive zeal. His end, unfortunately, seems to have justified any means. He steadfastly refused to have any dealings with RENAMO, echoing Chissano in terming them "bandits". He channelled dollars and support to Chissano. He gave, ostensibly, complete credence to reports issued by Maputo and ignored information to the contrary. He continued to do this even after it became obvious that RENAMO had to be dealt with in order to stop the war. Whether this was blindness, or inertia, or a fanatic adherence to his own policy, the war has been undoubtedly prolonged by his attitude.

### 3. South Africa

South Africa undeniably gave support to RENAMO in its early years. However, since the signing of the Nkomati Accord, support for RENAMO has been officially denied, and has at the very least, diminished to a trickle. There remain, however, two factions in South Africa. The military group would like to continue support for RENAMO, perhaps out of loyalty for an old client, perhaps in the unrealistic hope of a military victory. The foreign ministry



contingent favors increasing good relations with Chissano's government, and increasing economic investment in Mozambique. The South Africans have recently been giving aid to Mozambique, and have opened new avenues of contact with the Frelimo government. They have been praised for this in the community of southern African nations.

South Africa seems to have taken a new, practical assessment of its situation. The government is slowly moving to get rid of apartheid, and to make new regional alliances. International political pressure and economic reasons brought on by sanctions forced South Africa to withdraw from Namibia. The same forces are causing the South Africans to form ties with the other Front Line African nations. Many South Africans view the United States as an unreliable ally, and feel that they must become part of an independent, self-sufficient African community of nations to survive. The announced Soviet and Cuban withdrawals from the area have facilitated this process.

The unfortunate casualty of this evolution is RENAMO. I questioned a senior South African army officer while I was in Johannesburg in May about how South Africans feel about RENAMO. He answered that the Frelimo propaganda machine has been very successful in tarnishing RENAMO's image. He said that, "many South Africans agree that RENAMO has a role to play, but that they must sort it out themselves. National reconciliation is the only solution. It is a Mozambican problem."6/

## RENAMO'S PUBLIC RELATIONS DEBACLE

### 1. Chissano's Chorus

RENAMO has many vocal critics. First and foremost is President Chissano, and his Mozambican news agency AIM. He calls RENAMO "bandits". I sat through a three hour meeting with Chissano in 1987 in which he must have used the word "bandit" 500 times. Then, a week later, he sent his Chief of Staff to brief us on RENAMO. He showed us intelligence on RENAMO's military organization, their civilian structure, the names of their provincial commanders, and even the serial numbers of the troops' weapons. And all of this after he had so vigorously denied that RENAMO even existed. Why? First, he had undoubtedly sensed our disbelief at his portrayal of RENAMO (those of us who had not nodded off at the 453rd "bandits"), and wanted to dispel the idea that he wasn't being exactly honest with us. Second, he seems to think that, by denying RENAMO any legitimacy, he will not have to deal with them, and can prevent Western powers from talking with them as well. This strategy has been remarkably successful. Frelimo controls the news agency, AIM, in Mozambique, and the news organs of neighboring countries which are largely sympathetic to Chissano, pick up whatever it reports without question. These stories are then parroted in the international news media, and in this fashion a whole horrible mythology about RENAMO has been born. Few politicians are

willing to challenge monster image of RENAMO.

The major emphasis of these stories is that RENAMO are a collection of murderous savages, interested only in rape, pillage, and gratuitous slaughter, and that no government should debase itself by dealing with them. Perhaps some of them are true. African wars are not noted for their humanity and gentlemanly behavior, and I can easily believe that the uneducated, primitive soldiers in both Frelimo and RENAMO have committed some brutal acts. RENAMO, however, disciplines its soldiers severely for excesses, and brutality is certainly not an official policy. RENAMO relies on the people for support, and cannot afford to alienate them. I can give two examples of stories that were questionable or false, and yet were reported as gospel in the international news. (One need only refer to the recent official news coverage in the People's Republic of China to ascertain the standards of truthfulness in Marxist controlled news agencies.)

When I was in Africa in 1987, there were two "massacres" attributed to RENAMO, one at Homoine and the other at Manjacaze. Homoine came first. Reports of what happened at Homoine were riddled with logical inconsistencies and dubious reporting methods, but the Government version was emblazoned across the international press for weeks. The Government claimed that 300-600 crisply uniformed and booted RENAMO soldiers had entered Homoine, going first to the hospital, where they shot the patients. Then they rounded up 386 civilians and killed them.

The attackers wrote pro-RENAMO slogans on the building. All the civilians were buried later in a mass grave, but no one saw the gravedigger do this, and it is not clear that the bodies were ever identified or counted. The problems with this account are several. First, RENAMO, almost never travels in groups as large as 300-600. They do not have new uniforms or boots. It would be very difficult to round up 386 civilians in order to shoot them. Africans vanish into the bush at the first sound of gunfire. Also, dressing up in the enemy's uniforms and committing atrocities in his name is a time-honored tactic of war in Africa. Besides, only left-wing, sympathetic press were allowed timely access to the site. Everyone else had to wait 10 days to two weeks. Nevertheless, the international press raised a great hue and cry against the atrocities of RENAMO.

A few weeks later a second "massacre" allegedly happened at Manjacaze. I was invited to tour the massacre by the government, and, accompanied by the Minister of Culture, I did so. The story of the event kept mutating as the day went on. First there were 300 RENAMO, later 1000. Supposedly 101 civilians had been killed, but there was no evidence of this in the town--no blood, no bullet holes in the houses, no bodies. The main damage was to the power station, which had been blown up, and the administration building had been ransacked. I asked where the people had been killed and was told, with a vague gesture, "out of town." They took me to the hospital, where two beds had been slightly burned. I asked if anyone had been killed, and they

said, "well, no, the sick carried away the sicker." Finally I asked if there had been any slogans or grafitti, as there had been at Homoine. My guides looked puzzled, and conferred among themselves. Then, about twenty minutes later, we rounded a corner and there on a wall was a big sign which read "Viva RENAMO". I walked over and, for some reason, stuck my finger in the paint. To my shock, it was wet. I could only deduce that, whatever had happened at Manjacaze, the government had seized the opportunity to make it look like Homoine, even down to the much celebrated attack on the hospital. They had, however, forgotten the grafitti.

I toured the Manjacaze "massacre" with a State Department representative who was as sceptical as I was whether any "massacre" had occurred. The same representative had visited Homoine, two weeks after the event when he was finally given permission to go. He told me that he had serious misgivings about the news version of that event as well. He undoubtedly sent reports to his boss, Crocker, in Washington, but they appear to have had little effect. I delivered my report on the "massacres" to Crocker as well, but no whisper of interest came back.

More recently, as I was walking through Mozambique on my way to Gorongosa I listened to the news on the radio every night. At eight o'clock we would cluster around the fire and turn on the Voice of America or BBC. One evening we heard a report that Frelimo had captured five RENAMO bases, had killed 300 or so

guerrillas, and had liberated about 400 civilians. A major offensive and success for the Frelimo forces was described. We tried to figure out where the attack had occurred, and as the radio reported the place names, we realized that we were sitting in the middle of the alleged battle zone, and that we had walked through it all day. The story was a complete fabrication. I was outraged, but my RENAMO guides just laughed, and said that Frelimo put out stories like that all the time. These accounts are a sad testimony to how far a failing government is willing to bend the truth to stay in power.

Chissano's second favorite point in his propaganda war against RENAMO is that they have no civilian administration capability. If pushed to admit that RENAMO may have a few military structures and talents, he falls back on the refrain that they couldn't possibly form a government and run a country. He has been very successful in foisting this misconception onto the world's public opinion. The most common vision of RENAMO is that they are a band of "anti-Robin Hoods", taking from the poor to give to themselves, and committing no small amount of mayhem in the process. My experience on my 300 mile walk does not support this picture. Instead, I saw schools, clinics, a hospital, and a large civilian political meeting. There were posters of President Dhlakama everywhere--he has obviously started campaigning for his long-hoped-for elections. The people interacted in a very friendly way with our soldier escorts. We were given food, directions, and I received a variety of curious

looks, but no one exhibited fear or dislike. At Gorongosa I had interviews with several of RENAMO's civilian officials who described to me their current organization, and their goals for their country. (The full text of these interviews is given in the Appendices.) I spoke with the Chiefs of the Departments of Ideology, Education and Culture, Agriculture, Health, and Internal Administration. Each Department is organized at the provincial, regional, district, local and zonal levels, and from the district level down promotes a parallel traditional organization. This consists of a paramount chief at the district level, and below him local chiefs, subchiefs, and headmen of zones. Each headman administers 4 or 5 households. These structures are established and working in all of RENAMO's liberated areas. (Diagrams of RENAMO's civilian administration, and also its military structure are given in the Appendices.)

Chissano's last favorite jibe against RENAMO is that they were created by the White Rhodesians, and then taken over by the White South Africans, and that they are nothing but puppets in the ongoing racist war against legitimate African leaders.

## 2. Crocker's Contribution

Chester Crocker has added considerably to the negative image of RENAMO. President Dhlakama maintains that Crocker personally invented the term "bandits." Certainly, he has never had a good word to say about RENAMO, and has undercut any chance they might

have had to establish themselves as a legitimate political entity. His last, and most damaging, round was fired in April 1988. Plans were being made to bring Dhlakama to the US. The arrangements were well underway when Crocker was personally asked whether he would try to prevent Dhlakama from coming. This was on a Friday. He denied that he could do anything to impede Dhlakama's visit. Then, the next day, on a Saturday even, he called in the South African Ambassador and hauled him over the coals, asking if the South Africans were involved, and saying that a visit by Dhlakama would be an insult to the US and regarded as a hostile act by the South African government. He obviously assumed that if the President were to leave Mozambique, he would do so through South Africa. Then, the next Monday, he released the "Gersony Report." This may have been a coincidence, maybe not, but the effect was devastating.

This report, entitled "Summary of Mozambican Refugee Accounts of Principally Conflict-Related Experience in Mozambique", was written by Robert Gersony on contract to the State Department. It has had an incalculably disastrous effect on RENAMO's reputation in governmental and media circles. It accuses RENAMO of murdering at least 100,000 civilians, of systematic destruction of civilian areas, and of institutionalized rape, beatings, lootings, abductions and mutilations. The report was received as gospel, and rumors of "Pol Pot style atrocities" scurried around Washington. The newspapers reported all of its ghoulish details. Yet, many



questions can be asked about the methodology of the report and about the author's occasionally non sequitur conclusions.

Mr. Gersony writes about conditions inside RENAMO controlled territory, drawing his conclusions from information given him by refugees in camps both inside and outside of Mozambique. He most likely has accurately and ingeniously presented his data. The problem is with his data. Surely it is a minimum academic research standard to have set foot inside an area about which you propose to write, and to use evidence more direct than hearsay.

The author admits that his sample had some problem spots: He had to speak through interpreters, few interviewees could count above ten, most were primitive, superstitious people, utterly dependent on the authorities who ran the camps where they lived. Gersony writes:

There were no complaints against the government soldiers from refugees inside Mozambique. All of the complaints against these came from refugees outside Mozambique. This may reflect a natural hesitation of refugees in the Government controlled areas to express criticism of the soldiers under whose protection they live.]

The author did not seem to be aware that these restraints on expression also were true in refugee camps in Malawi, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. I have visited with several missionary families who work in the Malawian camps. They all assert that Frelimo agents have free access to the camps, and that all are infiltrated and unofficially regulated by SNASP, Frelimo's secret police. This assertion has been confirmed by a senior Malawian Security Official. The same conditions prevail in Zimbabwe and Tanzania, countries friendly to Frelimo and violently opposed to

RENAMO. Of Mr. Gersony's 25 sites, 22 were in these countries. The remaining 3 were in South Africa. O

The remarkable content and similarities in the reports can be partially attributed to two things: a simple people's desire to please those who feed them, and their universal exposure to Frelimo propaganda against RENAMO. More than likely, whatever they heard on the radio, they repeated to their benefactors. Also, once in the camps, they undoubtedly absorb the "party line" from Frelimo agents and earlier refugees, and out of fear and peer pressure, adhere to it. I would question the "high level of credibility" the author assigns to the refugee accounts. Even his final statistics have a ring of fantasy. "Thus," he writes, "the combined negatives concerning RENAMO were 96<sup>(2)</sup>, versus 17<sup>(2)</sup> for Frelimo. Combined positive plus 'no complaints' concerning Frelimo were 83<sup>(2)</sup>, versus 4<sup>(2)</sup> for RENAMO." B Both RENAMO and Frelimo draw their troops from the same pool--largely uneducated, unsophisticated, bush-born Mozambicans. It defies common sense that their behavior in a military situation would be so different that one side would commit all of the atrocities, and the other side none. It is also irrational to presume that RENAMO trains its troops to be barbarous. They are a guerrilla force which relies on the good will of the people to survive. They have not only survived, but their numbers have grown.

Mr. Gersony asserts that RENAMO divides all of the areas which it controls into "tax areas, control areas, and destruction areas" in which the population are regulated by methods ranging

from severe to inhumanly brutal. I walked through Tete and Sofala provinces on my way to Gorongosa, and at least in those areas I can testify that this alleged structure does not exist. We walked all day, for 19 days, and our guides were often unsure of the route. Frequently they would stop and ask the local people for directions, and we would wander off again. Several times our group requested a different stopping place, or a different route, and they always complied. The route could not have been planned in order to hide the massive destruction, starvation and brutalization of the people that Gersony describes. (I was often convinced that our route wasn't planned at all. Our guides didn't use compasses, and some days we would walk in great loops, going along the best available paths. We often changed course, following local advice.) In fact, the population was friendly, curious, and unafraid. We most often slept near a headman's hut, and once our group, RENAMO soldiers and all, participated in a drumming and dancing party. We were freely given food and directions. No one was starving, no one ran into the bush at our approach. This is not the behavior of a people that has been raped, mutilated, and murdered.

My evidence is corroborated by that of Nicholas della Casa, <sup>the</sup> ~~an~~ English journalist who was held by RENAMO for a year and a half on the suspicion of being a spy, and was released last year. He travelled with RENAMO all over Mozambique during the 1987 drought. He reports that the soldiers were reduced to eating only nuts for a whole month, but that he saw no forced

extraction of food from the people. In fact, RENAMO soldiers organized people to bring food from the provinces which had it, to those without, and distributed it to the people. Nick's opinion of RENAMO is so good that, despite his spell as their prisoner, he returned to RENAMO territory with us in May to make a documentary.

There was plenty of food while we were there, and RENAMO does have a collection system. They run food storage centers called "controls" to which the people bring their surplus. We stayed at several "controls". The amount brought was left to the discretion of the farmer, and the people seemed to come willingly. In a country with no refrigeration, little storage, and no outlets in which to sell, their surplus is just that--extra--and they might as well donate it. In addition, as we walked through cultivated areas, the soldiers never took food from the fields. If we wanted corn, or fruit, they always asked the owner of the fields for permission. RENAMO soldiers are severely punished for stealing even an ear of corn. One day we walked twelve hours with no food--no breakfast, no lunch, no snack, no nothing. I was casting covetous glances at every passing papaya. We took nothing.

RENAMO does, as Mr. Gersony reports, use civilian porters. The only way to transport anything is to carry it, usually on your head. There are very few paths wide enough to allow a land rover--besides, I didn't see any land rovers. RENAMO supposedly has some functional motorcycles, but I never saw those either.

Almost everything is transported by foot. All of the soldiers carry things and I can easily believe that they get civilians to carry things as well. However, there was no indication that they starved or beat their porters to death, as Mr. Gersony alleges. On three occasions our party took a civilian along, twice to show the way, and once to carry a pack. These civilians, however, only stayed with us for a few miles, and then went back.

Finally, Mr. Gersony's report on the treatment of women is questionable. He says, "Another function of the young girls and adult women is to provide sex to the combatants. From refugee reports it appears that these women are required to submit to sexual demands, in effect to be raped, on a frequent and sustained basis."9 This implies that RENAMO sanctions and institutionalizes rape, which, given their dependence on the support of the population, and the good relations I observed between the civilians and the soldiers, is improbable. In 1986 Robert MacKenzie of Freedom Inc. was in Zambezia province, escorting some missionaries out of Mozambique, and he witnessed RENAMO prosecution of a rape case. A senior military commander had raped a girl, and her parents had complained to RENAMO. The Commander was dragged before the troops, demoted, and beaten. Then he was sent to the girl's village where he was also beaten. He re-entered RENAMO stripped of all rank. If RENAMO sanctioned rape, the aggrieved parents would hardly have gone to them to administer justice for the crime.

So, why are there were so many refugees--650,000 at last

count in Malawi alone? I asked President Dhlakama, and he answered that Frelimo has a conscious policy of creating refugees. With the assistance of the Zimbabwean air force, they use bombing and intimidation to alienate the civilian population from RENAMO. "The Zimbabweans," he said, "know from their own experience of a guerrilla war in Rhodesia how much guerrillas rely on the population." One day on our walk I heard jets conducting bombing runs, and they did not appear to be near any military target.

My missionary friends analyze the refugee problem in a way similar to Dhlakama's. The people hear the bombing, or experience some war-related incident, and they run away. They come to the camps where they are housed and fed, and receive more medical care than they've ever had. They don't have to work. So they stay. One missionary argued that the international aid was creating a mass of idlers out of previously hard-working farmers, and that the food aid should be cut off so they would go back to their farms in Mozambique. However, word of free food spreads back, and more come.

Mr. Gersony's report, however, is an official document, and has been widely quoted. It has effectively prohibited any even-handed political contact with RENAMO. What statesman would wish to deal with the modern equivalent of Attila the Hun? The Gersony Report has closed a lot of doors, and closed a lot of minds.

### 3. Sons of Gersony

Two other reports have followed the Gersony report. These are not directly attributable to Chester Crocker, but they use the same methodology and quote the Gersony Report as a source. The report of William Minter to the Ford Foundation, "The Mozambican National Resistance as Described by Ex-Participants", interviews supposed ex-RENAMO soldiers who have turned themselves in to Frelimo in return for amnesty. This is a questionable sampling to begin with, and further compromised by the fact that they were produced by the Government in Maputo, and were under Government control. One of Mr. Minter's conclusions is that "at least 90% of the RENAMO rank and file are recruited by force." 10 I asked President Dhlakama about this and he laughed and asked me in return how he could control an army which was 90% unwilling to be there? He supposed that he could tie them up, and then give them a weapon, but he didn't think they would fight very well that way. In addition, during our walk our group of soldiers often became strung out over several kilometers, those who were barefoot and carrying the heaviest burdens falling hours behind. There was nothing to prevent them from running away, as they surely would have done had they been unwilling recruits. Instead, each night everyone straggled wearily but loyally into camp.

Finally, William Finnegan has published part one of his "A Reporter at Large--Mozambique Part I" in the New Yorker. He also writes about RENAMO from hearsay and never ventured into contact

with them. His article is a strange collage of conflicting opinions. He states at one point that "RENAMO come from HELL."<sup>11</sup> He repeats allegations that they decapitate the heads of old people to use as seats, and that they eat children. He states these things as if he accepts them as fact. Yet, in the next breath, he says that he "became obsessed with developing an accurate picture of life with RENAMO. It was an ambition sure to be frustrated, because there were countless versions of the thing, many of them contradictory..."<sup>12</sup> He quotes Minter and his findings, but later he takes issue with Minter's conclusions that RENAMO soldiers are largely conscripted by force saying, "it does defy common sense that an army of captives would fight as fiercely as RENAMO is often reported to do."<sup>13</sup> He quotes the Gersony Report lavishly, but several pages later allows that "the State Department's tone, which conjured up great slave camps, seemed wrong."<sup>14</sup> Mr. Finnegan's article is an honest attempt to make sense of all the conflicting information about Mozambique. He admits that he doesn't really have the ability to judge among the truths, lies, lurid accounts, propaganda and misinformation, so he gives them all, kind of mashed together. He at least reports some from both sides. He should go visit RENAMO before he writes part II.

#### 4. RENAMO's Culpability

It is a sad fact that these reports stand alone and conquer public opinion by default. RENAMO is its own worst



enemy in the area of public relations. They remain isolated in the bush, and produce no authoritative external newsletter. Their foreign representatives are remote, scattered, and in disarray. RENAMO also seems to attract a lunatic fringe of "guerrilla war groupies" who volunteer to espouse their cause, to the infinite detriment of RENAMO's credibility.

For example, in Washington, D.C. there are now two so-called RENAMO information offices, each fighting shrilly with the other. If someone asked to speak with a responsible RENAMO representative, they would be hard pressed to come up with anyone both accessible and rational. Evo Fernandez, their Minister of Research, was murdered in Lisbon last year and, their best spokesman is a refugee in Canada and barred from political activities.

#### FROM CROCKER TO COHEN

Chester Crocker, however, is no longer Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. His replacement, Herman Cohen, is a career diplomat with extensive African experience. I interviewed him on June 7, 1989 and asked whether the State Department policy with regard to RENAMO had changed. He answered that it had not. He said that the (US) has a normal relationship with Chissano's government and doesn't want to have a relationship with RENAMO. He said that the Mozambican government had been very helpful to the (US) in a regional context, specifically in preventing cross-border violence with South

Africa, in assisting the (US) in dealing with the Angolan government, and in helping to ease tensions between South Africa and the rest of the Front Line states. He asserted that Chissano was indeed moving away from his earlier Stalinist-type policies, (Mr. Cohen called them "Stalinist"), but allowed that he had a long way to go. He added, however, that "we look toward a political solution." He seemed aware that, even with continued assistance, Chissano cannot expect to attain a military victory.

I asked him what role he saw for the State Department, if any, in resolving the conflict in Mozambique. He answered that the State Department would make itself available as a negotiator, if all sides desired it. He suggested that in a regional context the State Department could talk with the Soviets, the South Africans and the Zimbabweans. In his confirmation hearings Mr. Cohen said that he would talk to anybody if it would do some good, and he reiterated this to me. He said, "Yes, we would talk to Dhlakama if it would be useful."

I thought that Mr. Cohen was more open minded than Mr. Crocker, and that he had a more realistic assessment of the situation in Mozambique. I hardly expected him to announce a reversal of (US) policy, since the great ship of state cannot make tight turns, and, indeed, RENAMO are very small fish in the teeming ocean of southern African politics. However, it is not necessary to reverse US policy in order to give RENAMO a fair shake. I found Mr. Cohen's willingness to recognize that RENAMO exists and, if helpful, to talk to them, to be a refreshing

change.

#### INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT AFONSO DHLAKAMA

How does President Dhlakama feel about all this? He has been fighting now for ten years, without much external support and in the face of international opprobrium. I interviewed him when I got to Gorongosa in May 1989, and the following is the entire text of that interview.

President Afonso Dhlakama

May, 1989, Gorongosa, Mozambique

Q. How many armed, how many support personnel does RENAMO have? What is the support from the population? Is RENAMO growing? How long can RENAMO keep on fighting?

A. RENAMO has 25,000 troops, not all with weapons. 21,000 are armed, the rest are in training, ready for fighting. This includes all the support personnel--since everyone is a combatant. We have plans to increase the manpower, but we rely on captured weapons. At the moment we want to take our best soldiers and form them in special, semi-conventional battalions. We have at the moment 6 battalions in the center, they are both guerrilla and semi-conventional. In addition, there are 2 in Maputo province, 2 in Zambezia, one in Nampula, one in Inhambane, and one in Gaza. We are preparing one in Cabo del Gado and one in Niassa. There are a total of 13.

Guerrilla wars are protracted wars. However, the situation

appears ripe. Frelimo having economic and political troubles. Militarily the war has been won. If it hadn't been for foreign advisors and troops, RENAMO would be in Maputo. The FPLM doesn't fight, they run. Only the foreign troops stand and fight. The FPLM doesn't want to fight, and the foreigners are demoralized. The population is for RENAMO, so why should the war continue? The external economic support of Frelimo, the UK, US, France, Italy, Germany, all prolong the destruction. It is no longer a war. The British have trained thousands of Zimbabweans who, as soon as they come to Mozambique, throw down their weapons and run away. The British effort is a joke.

Q. What portion of Mozambique does RENAMO control?

A. RENAMO controls all of Mozambique, except for the largest cities, and a few smaller ones which are encircled. You can only go 7 kilometers out of Maputo, and then you are in RENAMO territory. In all of these areas RENAMO has a civil administration.

Q. Does RENAMO have any outside support, governmental or private?

A. There is no governmental support, but certain European private organizations give help. There are certain sympathetic parties in the US, but no aid. There is no governmental aid from Oman or Morocco, this is Frelimo propaganda that RENAMO has aid from these sources.

Q. What is the role of the Zimbabweans, their effect? Do you

hear that they want to pull out?

A. The original intention of the Zimbabweans in 1984 was to eliminate RENAMO. Now they have moved to a containment policy. The effect against RENAMO has been negligible, but the major effect has been on the population of Mozambique. Bombing and intimidation are the strategy to alienate the civilian population from RENAMO. They are consciously creating a refugee problem. The Zimbabweans from their own experience of a guerrilla war in Rhodesia know how much guerrillas rely on the population. Mugabe declared 2 years ago that he would fight a guerrilla war, but so far they are only using population alienation techniques. The Zimbabweans are 8000 on the Beira Corridor and 60 kilometers on either side. They also have garrisons in other provinces, except the north which they left in 1987. They convoy the corridor in Tete, and are also near the Malawi border. It must be economically difficult for Zimbabwe. In 1985 and 1986 they casevaced bodies and wounded back. Now they leave the bodies and some of the wounded. RENAMO carries out an action against the railroad or the pipeline in the Beira Corridor once every week. The Zimbabweans are here as a repayment of war debt to Frelimo. Mugabe, therefore, finds it difficult to withdraw. The Tanzanians have not withdrawn. Only 1500 were withdrawn from Quilimane because of a conflict with the FPLM. In Zambezia, Niassa, Cabo del Gado, and northern provinces 7700 permanent Tanzanians remain. Reinforcements may be on the way. There are very few Malawians, about 350. There are some white mercenaries

with Frelimo. They are probably Cubans. Since 1984-5, the white men have remained in the headquarters areas, mostly in Tete, or they have been painting their faces black.

Q. Has the Frelimo amnesty program had any effect on your men's morale and strength?

A. I am not worried about the amnesty program. Since the declaration in January 1988 until the end of the first period, very few RENAMO soldiers gave themselves up. If the program had been effective, they would not have had to extend it, but they did. January 1988 was a period of maximum pressure on the government, so they started the amnesty program as a way to convince people things were getting better. Frelimo said that 3000 RENAMO gave themselves up, then they said that 2000 RENAMO attacked certain places. They have contradictory propaganda. Frelimo has never even admitted that there are liberated areas in Mozambique, yet here you are, having walked ten days through a peaceful RENAMO territory. Frelimo denies that we have a civilian administration, but we do.

Q. Would you comment on the Gersony Report?

A. The Gersony Report was an exercise to discredit RENAMO. It was commissioned with that in mind. If RENAMO had been guilty as accused, they would not be in the position they are now. Every guerrilla relies on the civilian population. It makes no sense to destroy the population. RENAMO would blind itself by alienating the people. It is obvious what refugees would say in camps infiltrated and controlled by the FFLM. As soon as the

journalists went away, the FFLM would punish those who talked against them. The Minter Report interviewed 32 people, supposedly ex-RENAMO. None was RENAMO. They were tutored by the secret service and presented as ex-RENAMO. A clue: They all said they didn't know the President. Every real RENAMO knows all about the President, and I have been seen by most of my troops. They also said that they were recruited by force, that 90% were. How could 10% control an unhappy 90%? Maybe we could tie them up and then give them a weapon, but they wouldn't fight very well that way. Propaganda is the only weapon Frelimo has left. They say we train children to kill, to smoke dope, and other things. All this is believed blindly by the West.

Q. What are your conditions for peace talks?

A. There are no preconditions. We want to get Frelimo to the table to discuss peace. We had previously wanted foreign troops to withdraw, but now we realize that that would completely destroy Frelimo. However, we want serious peace discussions, not amnesty. We could start even today, the time for talks is now.

Q. What about foreign involvement?

A. An African solution to the Mozambican problem would be the best. This would be important for the history of Mozambique. There are many African nations who believe that there must be peace in Mozambique, and that there must be negotiations to achieve this.

Q. With the change from Chester Crocker to Herman Cohen, what role would there be for the US?

A. It is early to say, but I have heard Herman Cohen say that he wants peace talks, and I am guardedly optimistic. I would welcome a fair United States participation in negotiations. The time looks good for negotiations now.

Q. Why do you think Chester Crocker was so vehemently anti-RENAMO?

A. I do not know. There is conjecture that Crocker had an agreement with Frelimo that he could present the destruction of RENAMO as his personal coup. It certainly appears to have been a personal campaign. He invented the term "bandits" and the the American press and even Savimbi against RENAMO. Crocker got Savimbi to support Machel. But even Crocker didn't manage to destroy RENAMO, even though he had a lot of authority and a lot of people behind him.

Q. What is the situation with your international representation?

A. I recognize an enormous lack of ways to combat Frelimo propaganda. There are five points:

1. We are fighting an established Marxist government with a history of anti-colonial struggle. International perception is that they won the colonial war and are now fighting bandits.
2. International perception is that RENAMO is a creation of Smith and Botha.
3. All the local front-line states, including South Africa, have allied themselves to discredit RENAMO.
4. RENAMO lacks broadcast facilities. Foreign correspondents in neighboring states cannot listen to RENAMO's side.



5. Our external representation is weak. There are communication problems among the representative, and communication between RENAMO and them is weak. Several have been more interested in their own personal intrigues than in RENAMO. Last year I met with my representatives and I hope the situation will get better. The enemy has the advantage over RENAMO on the outside, however.

President Dhlakama then made these closing remarks:

RENAMO is not as it is portrayed on the outside. We have been fighting since 1977, young and old, weak and strong, because we are fighting for the wishes of the people. If we were as portrayed by Frelimo, we would have disappeared long ago. The accusation that RENAMO was formed by Smith in Rhodesia is pure propaganda. We are a genuine popular organization. In its early stages RENAMO had some assistance from Rhodesia, but it is still Mozambican. Frelimo itself was formed in Tanzania, but no one says it is Tanzanian. RENAMO was formed in Mozambique and fights in Mozambique. It is nonsensical to argue that we are not Mozambican. RENAMO has its own democratic objectives: a multi-party government, free and fair elections, an assembly which represents the interests of the people, freedom of speech, and human rights. All of these do not exist under Frelimo. The people of Mozambique created RENAMO and continue to support it. We are not purely a military organization, we are a political organization. At the end of the colonial war we spoke with Frelimo about a system to replace the Portuguese. Frelimo

responded with violence and killed many of our politicians who disagreed with Frelimo policy. So, in order not to disappear, we moved to an armed struggle. However, we are a political party with an army. The military arm was created to achieve our political aims. We do not want to destroy Frelimo, that is not our objective. We want political change. If Frelimo wants to talk seriously about peace, we will leave our weapons. RENAMO is a strong central force, implanted in the country. Frelimo will find it impossible to destroy RENAMO. RENAMO is for peace, but a real peace in which the people can vote for their choice of government. The power in Mozambique must be with the 14,000,000 people, not with a military minority. The party should belong to the people, not vice versa. Unfortunately, the West does not know RENAMO.

(President Dhlakama spoke in Portuguese. His remarks were translated by British journalist Nicholas della Casa. Nicholas grew up in South America, and speaks excellent Portuguese. The President understands and speaks a good deal of English, but prefers Portuguese for official remarks.)

#### A FRESH WIND BLOWING?

So, is the West finally willing to "know RENAMO?" A change seems to be in the air. Mr. Cohen said that even Chissano is using the term "bandits" less often. Mugabe has said that he

wouldn't stand in the way of RENAMO-Frelimo talks. The State Department has actually recognized that RENAMO exists. President Dhlakama has said that he will come to the peace table with no pre-conditions except that the talks be serious and fair. These are major shifts. It would be wonderful if the State Department would use its skills in quiet diplomacy and Byzantine negotiations to bring peace to Mozambique. The country needs peace. The only way to do that is to talk to RENAMO, talk honestly and fairly. President Dhlakama is too strong to allow himself to be sold out.

Whatever you think of RENAMO, they are there, 25,000 strong, self-sufficient and committed. Despite all of the foreign assistance pouring in to Chissano, he is unable to vanquish them and they are prepared to fight on for their goals. Continued chaos in Mozambique is not in anyone's interest, and one would hope that Chissano would be willing to relinquish his monopoly on power in order to bring peace to his war-ravaged people. Surely the time has come to give RENAMO a chance to state their case. They want elections. We advocate elections for everyone else, why not for Mozambicans? In America we espouse the right of free speech and for a fair hearing. How about for RENAMO too?

1. My sources for these statistics are: Africa Contemporary Record, Africa South of the Sahara, Economist Intelligence Unit Country Reports and Country Profiles, Expresso (Lisbon), Inst. Democracia e Liberdade, and A Descolonizacao vol 1 (1979), all quoted in a classified South African intelligence analysis of Mozambique, 1989. Also, Finnegan, William, "A Reporter At Large (Mozambique-Part I)", The New Yorker, May 22, 1989.

2. Information on RENAMO's military capabilities and structure was obtained in my interview with President Afonse Dhlakama in May 1989.

3. Top Secret report by the Zimbabwe Central Intelligence Organization of a meeting between Mozambican President Samora Machel, now deceased, Zimbabwean Minister for State Security Emerson Munangagwa, and Rex Nhongo, Zimbabwean Army Commander, June 12, 1987.

4. Maier, Karl, "Civilians Pay Price of Renamo Attacks," The Washington Post, June 5, 1989, page A 13.

5. Maier, Karl, "Soviet Military Advisers To Leave Mozambique", The Washington Post, June 3, 1989, page A 10.

6. Interview with a senior South African army officer, Johannesburg, South Africa, May 1989.

7. Gersony, Robert, "Summary of Mozambican Refugee Accounts of Principally Conflict-Related Experience in Mozambique", submitted to Ambassador Jonathan Moore, Director, Bureau of Refugee Programs and Dr. Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of African Affairs, April 1988, page 8.

8. Ibid., page 23.

9. <sup>Ibid.</sup> ~~Op. cit.~~, Gersony, page 13.

10. Minter, William, "The Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo) as Described by Ex-participants", Research Report Submitted to: Ford Foundation and Swedish International Development Agency, Washington, D.C., March 1989, page 5.


11. Op. cit., Finnegan, page 58.

12. Ibid., page 68.

13. Ibid., page 71.


14. Ibid., page 73.

RENAMO MILITARY ORGANIZATION



Appendix I

RENAMO'S CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION



Each Department is organized by:

Regions → Provinces → They work with a parallel traditional organization: →

Districts-----Paramount Chief--he owns land  
 Localities-----Chiefs and Subchiefs  
 Zones-----Headmen--4 or 5 households

RENAMO'S CURRENT ADMINISTRATION (MAY, 1989)

1. Department of Internal Administration--Vicente Zacarius Ululu
  2. Department of Ideology--Anselmo Victor
  3. Department of Information--Francisco Moises Nota
  4. Department of Health and Social Services--Cristovao Filipe Soares
  5. Department of Education and Culture--Antonio Alfainho
  6. Department of Finance--Sebastiao Temporario
  7. Department of External Relations--Artur Janeiro da Fonseca
  8. Department of Agriculture--Paris Raul Baza
  9. Department of Research--Ascencio De Freitas
  10. The League of Women--Latifa Grao Bene
  11. The League of Youth--Mario Luis Gonzaga
- Chief of the President's Secretariat--Jose Augusto
- Chief of Defense--Antonio Fedro

- ~~5. Department of Education and Culture--Antonio Alfainho~~
  - ~~6. Department of Finance--Sebastiao Temporario~~
  - ~~7. Department of External Relations--Artur Janeiro da Fonseca~~
  - ~~8. Department of Agriculture--Paris Raul Baza~~
  - ~~9. Department of Research--Ascencio De Freitas~~
  - ~~10. The League of Women--Latifa Grao Bene~~
  - ~~11. The League of Youth--Mario Luis Gonzaga~~
- ~~Chief of the President's Secretariat--Jose Augusto~~
- ~~Chief of Defense--Antonio Pedro~~

### *Appendix III : Interviews with Department Chiefs.*

#### INTERVIEW WITH ANSELMO VICTOR

#### CHIEF OF THE DEPARTMENT OF IDEOLOGY

Q. What is the function of the Department of Ideology?

A. The purpose of the Department of Ideology is to diffuse throughout the masses the political objectives of RENAMO and to explain to them why we are fighting. We want to counter Frelimo



propaganda, which is our main problem.

There is a Central Office and then provincial delegates. If the area is large enough, there is a regional director. Below the regions are districts, localities and zones, which all have delegates. The delegates are usually local people who know the area. Another main function is to transmit problems of the local people upwards. This channel of communications is two way: problems go up, policy is fashioned and goes down. These are mainly political and ideological problems. Problems in interaction between civilians and soldiers are handled by these channels.

Meetings are called by local delegates to spread the ideological word. They have no radios. There are a few pamphlets to orientate the delegates. The message is tailored to how long the area has been liberated. In long-standing areas there is very little political propagation. In new areas we call a meeting to judge the tenor of the population. Many people run away from Frelimo controlled areas into RENAMO territory, so population is in our favor. No one has ever refused to come to a meeting, even though they are invited and not forced to come.

Q. Before a military operation, do you prepare the population?

A. We don't prepare a zone, but we do have some members in enemy areas to do limited work. Frelimo has radios, newspapers, so their propaganda arm is stronger.

Q. After liberation, do you have problems with any of the people? Perhaps those who continue to listen to Frelimo radio?

A. The population has been told by Frelimo that they will all be killed if RENAMO comes. When they are not killed, they begin to see that Frelimo tells lies. The population can see for themselves, make up their own minds.

Q. Do the people know the difference between communism and democracy?

A. The masses don't know the difference between a communist and a democrat, but they have seen the disastrous results of Frelimo policies, i.e. no food, refugees, etc. Therefore, they are in favor of RENAMO. RENAMO ideology is based on what the people want. We are largely pro-Western, but we do not want to impose an outside system on the people. We want to fashion a specifically Mozambican system, responsive to the needs, desires and traditions of the people.

Q. In that context, how important is the Western concept of "one man, one vote" and elections in general?

A. By and large, the democratic system of voting is African. Chiefs are elected traditionally. But that is not a national process, African politics have not traditionally been national. Now we want to move the voting concept into a national context.

Q. How confident are you that RENAMO will win an election?

A. We are fighting for free elections. If another government wins, then so be it. RENAMO wants the people to have the choice. Frelimo's economic and social reforms have been in response to international pressure. They are moving closer to RENAMO policies. If Frelimo invites RENAMO to take part in the

political process as an opposition party, and holds free elections, there will be no more fighting. Frelimo is now changing into RENAMO. If they do this to the point of election, the war will stop.

Q. If elections do come, how will you ensure that they are free and fair?

A. There must be a pre-election period for organization--a census, voter registration. A joint commission of RENAMO and Frelimo would oversee this. International representation would be required.

INTERVIEW WITH ANTONIO ALFAINHO  
CHIEF OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND CULTURE

Q. What does the Department of Education and Culture do?

A. The Department was started in 1977, one year after the beginning of the war, to prepare the children for the revolution. As the war progressed it expanded, and we are now in all the localities all over the country. Our first priority is the training of teachers, who are sent from the districts to the training centers. At the district level there is term-by-term preparation in the two weeks preceding each term for the teachers. When an area is liberated, the teachers stay. Some also come from Frelimo areas into RENAMO areas. We use these professional teachers to train younger teachers.

RENAMO has 20,744 teachers. 4250 are secondary school teachers. 3,786,177 students attend school, both elementary and secondary. There are 950 secondary schools, 9775 primary schools. Anyone with a 7th or 8th grade education is conscripted as a teacher. They are sent to areas where teachers are needed, so teachers are often not local.

Children start at the age of 6. They learn Portuguese at 5. At 10 or 11 they go to secondary schooling. Teachers teach up to the 7th grade. RENAMO has no teachers qualified to go up to the 9th grade.

Q. How long are the teachers trained, and how do they live?

A. Primary school teachers have 3-4 months instruction. Secondary teachers receive 6 or 7 months. The provincial centers provide the instruction. If there are enough people in the provinces, then we make district training centers. The teachers board with locals and are supported by the locals until they can build their own house and grow their own food. Most often the local administrator will house the teacher until he becomes independent. Teachers receive clothes from RENAMO, but no salary.

Q. What is the curriculum?

A. Biology, geography, natural sciences, and Portuguese are on the curriculum. Boys and girls are treated equally. (Author's Note: I am sure that this is a pipe dream curriculum in most cases. The schools that I observed were without books, pencils,

paper, or anything else. Most often the children were chanting numbers, or the letters of the alphabet.)

Q. What is the goal of education? What choice do the children have but to return to the farms?

A. We take the children with the greater ability and give them work in other departments. We train them in health, or agriculture and give them jobs. This is so that the children are not disillusioned by the educational process and feel they have no opportunities.

Q. I can see that you have few supplies in you schools. What do you need most?

A. We need pencils, chalk, paper and erasers.

INTERVIEW WITH PARIS RAUL BAZA  
CHIEF OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Q. What does the Department of Agriculture do?

A. Our main objective is to train civilian technicians. Agriculture in Mozambique is at the moment subsistence type, using only one method. We are trying to give the population way of increasing production. We are trying to improve the quality of subsistence, not develop commercial agriculture. One exception is cotton, which it is possible to exploit commercially.

We have district centers of instruction in basic, voluntary education on how to improve production. Demand for these classes

is great, as the people see their neighbors increasing their yields. We cannot cope with the demand.

The basic course lasts 2 months and is basic land husbandry: not to mix crops in a field, to use crop rotation, to let fields lie fallow, not to slash and burn. We encourage them not to burn the trees, but to use them as fuel. Animal husbandry is taught for chickens, ducks and goats. The tsetse is our greatest problem. It kills the animals. Those who are trained pass the training on in their localities.

Q. Do you have a game conservation program?

A. Hunting is controlled for civilians and soldiers. If an area needs meat, we allocate that a certain number of animals can be killed.

Q. How do the people acquire land?

A. Through the Paramount Chiefs, the land is allocated for clearing. Precious wood-bearing land is reserved for the future. Peasants cannot just go and clear wherever they like.

Q. What measures do you take to prevent famine?

A. We emphasize the concept that the yield should be divided into: 1. a reserve for next year's crop, 2. use, 3. excess for sale. The state advises this, but there is no control over planting. Excess produce is used for barter trade, which is the only trade extant.

The Department advises when one area has a deficit and another a surplus, but leaves the rest up to the peasants, to transport and trade. In the 1987 famine, the Department

organized grain from Zambezia to be sent to Sofala where there was none. The chiefs were used to implement this, using civilian transport. Cassava was also brought and planted for the first time in Sofala.

Q. How do you feed RENAMO soldiers?

A. The vast majority of the requirements come from the population. Some bases have plantations, but they supply only a small part of their needs. Each family sets aside a certain part of their produce for the soldiers. This is voluntary, quotas are not set. By popular consent, each group of several houses selects a fellow to collect the produce and take it to a "control". There is one "control" center per zone. Soldiers travelling through the area are treated as guests, (perhaps surprise guests). The peasants don't withhold their contribution because they can't hide it, or eat it in secret. So the people come forward with their surplus.

Q. What is your greatest problem?

A. We suffer from a lack of tools and seeds.

#### INTERVIEW WITH COARES CRISTOVAOL FELIPE

#### CHIEF OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH

Q. How is the Department of Health structured?

A. There are two branches of the Department of Health--civilian and military. The military follows the military structure: province, region, sector, zone and group. The civilian is

organized by province, region, district, locality and zone. The military structure primarily treats soldiers. Every unit has at least a group of medics. Also, the military does some civilian treatment if necessary. (Author's note: A medic was sent to accompany our group for our entire walk in May. Commandante Daniella carried a reasonable medic's kit, and treated our blisters, bites and scratches with exquisite care.)

All civilian areas have at least a representative from the Department of Health. Civilian recruitment of people who have previous medical experience is used as a training device. At each province there is a civilian and a military institute for instruction where these people teach. Locals selected by the Chiefs are sent to the courses. There are three levels--a 6 month course, 3 months, and a one to two month course. The shortest course only covers first aid. The three and six month courses include the basics of obstetrics, surgery and pediatrics, preventive health care and pre-natal health care. There is a separate organization of Preventive Health workers. Surgery is limited, but we deal with amputations and hernias, and the taking out of bullets and shrapnel.

Q. How many health workers do you have?

A. We have 1,800 civilian health workers of all grades, both men and women. There are 400 currently receiving instruction. There are 5000 trained military medics and 2000 recruits receiving training, most as low level first aid medics.

Q. What are your major problems?



A. We have a lack of medicine and instruments and educational material. The Red Cross has not brought in any surplus to leave behind. (Author's note: The clinics we visited were clean and orderly, but tragically lacking in the most basic supplies. They have no drugs, no bandages, no ointments or even iodine. )

Q. What are the major diseases?

A. Malaria, chicken pox, sleeping sickness. We have no preventive or curative treatment for malaria. We lost 200 children in Zambezia alone last year to chicken pox. Infantile diarrhea is also a problem. Anemia was a problem in 1986-87 during the famine, but now things are better. Intestinal parasites are a problem as well.

Q. What about nutrition?

A. Starvation is not a problem, but malnutrition is. The Preventive Health people give instruction to the people how to vary their diet and to eat just sudza. (Author's note: Sudza is the staple of the Mozambican diet. It is made of either corn or illet or sorghum flour and water. This is put in a large pot and boiled and stirred with a log until it resembles bathroom grout. Then it is eaten.)

Q. What about pre-and post-natal care?

A. We try to contact pregnant women and give them some instruction. We teach anti-diahrrea methods for infants. Our biggest problem is ignorance. Most of the women don't want to come to the hospitals to have their babies. Usually the older women assist at childbirth. We try to identify these mid-wives

and give them some instruction as well. Also, we have people who can go to the locality and attend a birth if we know in advance that there will be a problem.

Q. What about birth control?

A. The Preventive Health people give instruction, but it is an uphill struggle. Everyone wants lots of children.

Q. Do you have AIDS?

A. We have not identified it specifically because we have no way of doing so. We have seen several people who may have had it. Our areas have traditional sexual mores, which are quite conservative, and we have no truck routes or prostitution, so perhaps AIDS has not yet come.

In closing I would like to appeal to the international health organization to help us. They do not come to us because Frelimo will not let them, but we have the structures to deal with them, and we need their help very much.

INTERVIEW WITH VICENTE ZACARIUS ULULU  
CHIEF OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION

Q. What does the Department of Internal Administration do?

A. The Department deals with administering the population. We try to keep track of their standard of living, to make sure they have schools and hospitals, to encourage them to work on big farms and to prevent disease, and we ensure that the traditional Chiefs have the freedom to solve their own problems. We also

oversee the implementation of the programs of the other Departments. We also conduct a census of children of school age, and women. *In total, there are 7,283,000 people in RENAMO controlled, liberated areas. This excludes combat zones and cities.*

Q. What is the structure?

A. We have a headquarters and a secretariat with is divided into five areas: 1. Administration, 2. Social work, 3. Intelligence-- in addition to the military intelligence, we gather political intelligence, 4. recruitment--we recruit people for instruction in the various areas, 5. Finance--we collect money to assist all of the administrators in setting up their offices. Under the secretariat are the provincial directors, the the district directors, and then local administrators. The traditional Chiefs, subchiefs and headmen handle the grass roots. The local administrator deals with the Chief. The Provincial Director reports directly to me.

These directors are selected by ability and the level of their schooling. Most district administrators are old, and have worked during colonial days.

Q. Do you have police?

A. Yes. Civilian police work in shifts for the Department. They are controlled by the administrators. The Chiefs have their own police. The administration police are not armed.

Q. What is your judicial system like?

A. There are not many serious crimes which necessitate court action. Most crimes occur in the military zones where they are handled by the military. The traditional Chiefs handle almost

all civil cases. RENAMO has revived the traditional system of Chiefs and local systems of justice. Frelimo tried to eradicate the traditional system. When a case is so serious that it cannot be handled by the Chiefs, it is referred to the Administrator. In each district there is a group of elders and Chiefs who work with the Administrator to solve the problem.