SUPER-POWER RIVALRY IN AFRICA

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Ideological Origins.

The Soviet Union's challenge to the western powers in what is today known as the Third World was originally pursued through the Comintern in the 1920s, later changed to the Cominform. It had its inspiration in Trotsky's ideas of world revolution. With Trotsky's overthrow, state interests came to take priority over world revolution but without altogether abandoning this objective in situations likely to undermine western hegemony but without damaging Moscow's particular interests. The aims of the Comintern/Cominform were threefold: to implement the Third International's fight against imperialism (i.e. against western capitalism); to encourage the spread of revolutionary ideas and movements in the colonies and elsewhere; and to support communist parties worldwide. However, the Stalinist policy of putting the USSR's state interests first led to serious contradictions within the Cominform; this brought disillusionment to prominent colonial Marxist leaders such as George Padmore of the West Indias, Solly Sachs and H.M. Basner of South Africa.

By the mid-1930's, the Cominform came to be seen by colonial leaders, and others, as primarily an instrument of Soviet interests, which led to its disintegration. By the beginning of world war II, the only African successes it could claim were support for communist parties in Egypt, Sudan and South Africa, and a tenuous alliance with the Rassemblement Democratique Africain (RDA) in French West Africa. Quarrels between the pro- and anti-Stalinist elements (Fourth

International) divided and weakened these parties and movements.

Two developments during the period of the second world war gave new encouragement to Moscow. First, the Red Army's considerable military achievements created a wave of sympathy in the colonies, as well as a greater interest in "Socialist achievements". Second, the upsurge of anti-colonial liberation movements produced a political climate seemingly favourable to the USSR as a champion against western colonialism. By the end of the war it seemed that the Soviets would be in a strong position to forge effective alliances with the liberation movements and, so, undermine western influence. Support for national liberation struggles became a cornerstone in Moscow's foreign policy.

Super-power Rivalries.

Until the advent of Gorbachev, Africa was seen by the USSR and the US as a key continent in determining the new balance of world power which had become dislocated through the loss of West European hegemony over much of the globe, the emergence of the USSR as a new world power, and the new role of the US as the dominant leader of the western community. Along with the Middle East, South-East Asia and the Indian sub-continent, Africa became an important arena in the rivalry between the super-powers. (Aside from Cuba and, much more marginally, Nicaragua, the US faced no serious threat in Latin and Central America).

Super-power rivalries.

1. The Western Interests.

During world war II, the Americans' traditional anti-colonial tradition found strong expression in the policies of the Roosevelt administration. This produced considerable tension and disagreement between the United States and the European colonial powers. The Dutch were angered by Roosevelt's stand on Indonesia; the French were upset by United States' policy in Indo-China; the Belgians were strongly hostile over demands made for early independence of the Congo (now Zaire); the Portuguese were adamantly resistant to the idea that they should abandon Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde and Timor; and the British were in no mood to yield on India and the rest of the empire.

However, the post-war Labour government in Britain set in motion the decolonisation of its empire, which forced the French under de Gaulle to follow suit. The Belgians, but especially the Portuguese, were determined to try and hang on to what they held. The relatively peaceful way in which the British succeeded in transforming their emoire into a new Commonwealth of Nations, and the success of the French in meeting the demands for independence in sub-Saharan Africa (though not without major violence in Indo-China and Algeria), contributed substantially to bluntino the anti-western feelings of the colonial liberation movements. The Belgians rushed the Congo (Zaire) into chaotic independence

which, at one time, seemed to offer an opening to Moscow. Only the Portuguese and, at first, Spain clung obstinately to their role as imperial powers. After Franco, Spain decolonized its African colonies; but it was the obdurate refusal by the Portuguese to follow suit that created real opportunities for the USSR in, especially, Angola and Mozambique.

South Africa posed, and still poses, the most difficult problem for the west to solve in ways perceived as being conducive to protecting its economic and strategic interests.

The conceived western interest in Africa - now shared by the Americans as well as by the West Europeans - is twofold: to retain influence (political, economic and military) in the former colonies; and to deny opportunities to the USSR to expand its influence. These western objectives have largely been achieved, thus far, although the fate of South Africa still hangs in the balance. The only other African countries seen as failures of western policy are Angola and Mozambique (though increasingly less so in the latter case) and Ethiopia. The experience of Ethiopia (as in the case of Iran) is that the western powers vested their hopes and interests in the survival of Emperor Haile Selassie long after it had become clear that (as with the Shah of Iran) his days were numbered.

THE USSR INTERST AND ROLE IN AFRICA.

As befits its role as a challenging super-power, the USSR has sought to expand its influence and military capability globally. Under Stalin, Khruchev and Brezhnev, Moscow's consistent policy was to seek to undermine western interests, to expand Soviet influence in winning political allies, to improve its role as a trading nation and, above all, to strengthen its strategic position, especially as an emerging naval power. There is no evidence that the USSR ever worked to a master plan to achieve these objectives: its policies bear all the hallmarks of opportunism, but only in the sense of grabbing at opportunities as they presented themselves. Nevertheless, Soviet policy has been remarkably consistent in several major respects.

- It has given undeviating support to national liberation movements operating against governments regarded as belonging to the 'imperialist camp'.

- Whenever opportunities have presented themselves, it has sought to secure naval and air facilities from its clents - e.o. in securing a naval base in Alexandria under Nassar; in obtaining naval and air facilities in Somalia, and latterly in the Red Sea ports of Ethiopia.

- It has given strong political and diplomatic support, as well as military and some economic aid, to governments and movements identified as struggling against "imperialism", even when such protagonists did not profess to be supporters of Marxism or unqualified supporters of the USSR. In this respect it has remained

true to the original role it cast for itself as leading the struggle against "imperialism".

- It has worked determinedly since 1958 to undermine Chinese influence in Africa, as is exemplified in three particular cases. Its support for the tyrannical Idi Amin in Uganda (despite his declared opposition to communist ideology) was dictated by Moscow's need for a foothold in East Africa to counterbalance what it saw as the influence of the Chinese in Uganda's neighbour, Tanzania. It gave its military support to the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), led by the anti-communist Joshua Nkomo, in preference to the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), led by a Marxist-Leninist, Robert Mugabe, because his movement relied on Chinese military aid while he himself was in favour of "Maoist thought". Its initial military involvement in Angola was due, partly because the Chinese were supporting the opposition movements, and, partly, because it was drawn into the struggle by a strong Cuban initiative.

Moscow has been inconsistent in applying its policy of support for national liberation movements. For example, it supported the Eritrean People's Liberation Front when it began its struggle against Haile Selassie; but when it suited Moscow's interest to switch its alliance from Somalia to the military regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam in Ethiopia, it provided substantial military aid to his regime and engaged directly in the fight against the Eritreans. However, Moscow's consistent support for the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC) has enabled it, with the help of the S.A. Communist Party, to become involved in

a major way in the liberation struggle against apartheid. This influence, together with its alliance with the MPLA government in Angola, has ensured a major role for Moscow in the affairs of Southern Africa.

The question that needs to be addressed is why the Soviet Union was unable to exploit much more successfully the seemingly golden opportunities presented by the collapse of colonialism in Africa and in the Middle East. Several explanations account for this failure.

First, the Soviet Union failed to develop a policy capable of ensuring any lasting alliance with national liberation movements because the appeal of nationalism was much stronger than that of Marxist ideology, and were often in conflict over issues such as over the place of the class struggle in liberation strategy. Two essential characteristics of the anti-colonial movements have been their strong nationalist flavour and their support for the aspirational ideas of non-alignment. While willing to accept Soviet support for their liberation struggles, they almost uniformly rejected the choice of moving away from the "western camp" into the "Soviet camp". So long as it suited their nationalist interests, they accepted Soviet military and political support, but once they had achieved their immediate aim of liberation from alien rule, their next priority was to consolidate their independence by turning to those best able to provide them with opportunities for trade, economic and technical aid. Although not always even-handed in their

application of non-alignment policies, they mostly refused to become entangled in the struggles between the major foreign powers. The outstanding exception has been Ethiopia, which will be discussed presently.

Second, the Soviet Union lacked the economic resources, or the willingness to commit what they possessed, to meet the needs of their putative allies. The Soviets have been lavish in supplying military aid - a commodity which they do not lack. Their import needs and the present international economic order are unfavourable to the development of substantial trade between the USSR and most Third World countries. Except for Cuba, Vietnam and, to a lesser extent Ethiopia, Moscow and its COMECON partners have been unwilling to divert major economic resources to African countries. Indeed, as in the case of Angola, Moscow has in recent years openly advocated the need for African countries to develop their trade with the west. Because of the colonial heritage and for other reasons, Soviet technical aid has mainly been found to be inappropriate to African needs, forcing them to rely on western aid.

Third, the Marxist (or more accurately the so-called Marxist) regimes in Africa have been broken reeds with the exception, so far, of Ethiopia. Because of the civil war situation that has prevailed since Angola's independence and the support given to the challenging UNITA movement of Jonas Savimbi by South Africa and the US, the MPLA has never had an opportunity to implement its Marxist policies.

There is no structured Marxist party in the country; with effective power lies with the army. The MPLA government's hold on power is so tenuous that it was forced to accept the mediation of Washington over foreign troop withdrawals from its territory despite the American refusal to grant diplomatic recognition to the Luanda regime; and while its military aid comes entirely from the Soviet bloc and Cuba, its economic ties are almost exclusively with the west. Mozambique, which now enjoys the economic and political patronage of the west, has abandoned its Marxist commitments in favour of a policy of non-Marxist socialism.

The other so-called "Marxist regimes" - Guinea-Bissau, Benin and the Congo - have been high in Marxist rhetoric and low in performance. The latter two have survived mainly on French economic aid; both have now given up any pretensions of being Marxist, as has Guinea-Bissau. The "scientific socialism" of Siad Barre's regime in Somalia remained at an aspirational level only for so long as the USSR was fulfilling its role as the nation's armourer. Despite the official attachment to Marxism of the unified ZANU-Patriotic Front in Zimbabue, president Mugabe has followed a careful pragmatic course so as not to upset the basic economic structures he inherited at independence, and he has recently further liberalized his economic policies to encourage foreign investment.

Thus, with the exception of Ethiopia, the first four decades of independence have clearly demonstrated two basic realities: that "scientific socialism" has had little attraction for the first two generations of independent African leaders; and that the continent's trade and other economic ties seem indissolubly tied to the west, and are likely to remain so until real progress can be made in developing South-South links or, what seems unlikely in the foreseeable future, radical changes are made in the existing international economic order. The critical economic crisis through which Africa has been passing since the mid-1970s appears to have further strengthened the continent's ties with the west.

Two other developments have helped to strengthen western influence in Africa: the failure of post-Mao China to become a major actor in the Third World, and its inability to offer an alternative supply of economic aid to either the USSR or the west; and the new Soviet policies pursued by Gorbachev, which have a direct and important impact on Africa.

To sum up; Soviet policies in Africa have failed to produce any of the major aims originally envisaged (although the situation in Ethiopia and South Africa still remains problematic); Marxism as a state ideology has fallen on stony ground in the continent; and western influence in the continent has not been eroded as a result of decolonization, even though the relationship between Africa and the west remains characterized

by strongly ambivalent feelings due both to western policies over South Africa, the failure to alleviate the continent's heavy foreign indebtedness, and to provide adequate economic aid for sustainable growth. As is the case currently in the Soviet bloc and China, the impetus towards democratic multi-parliamentary government is growing significantly in the continent, suggesting a change in the post-independence climate which favoured single-party states and a domestic economy dominated by parastatals. It is now clear that parastatals - whatever their earlier promise of helping to establish national control over domestic economies - have resulted in creating a form of state capitalism rather than socialism, and have produced intolerable and inefficient bureacracies which, with some exceptions, have served to obstruct rather than promote economic growth.

CUBA'S ROLE IN AFRICA.

Although Cuba has in the past been a privileged partner of the USSR in Africa, Latin and Central America, it is a mistake to regard Castro as an instrument of Soviet policy. In many African eyes, Cuba is today regarded with more respect than the USSR, thanks especially to its committed role in Angola and its success in stemming the offensive of the South African army at the crucial battle of Cueto Cuanavale in 1988. The policies of Havana have been well summed up by Robert Pastor:[4]

"Cuba is a small country with a big country's foreign policy. No other developing nation maintains more diplomatic missions, intelligence operatives, and military advisers and troops abroad than does Cuba, not even the oil-producing states that can afford it. The gap between its internal resources and its external capabilities is filled by the Soviet Union, not because of altruism, but because the Soviets are assured that what the Cubans do abroad will serve their purpose".

This last statement requires some qualification. Although Cuba's expeditionary force of 14,000 troops was crucial to the Soviets' ability to sustain the regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam in defeating the Somali army in the Ogaden in 1975-76, Castro refused to allow his troops to be deployed against the Eritreans, leaving the Soviets with the thankless and onerous task of trying to put down their rebellion. More principled than Moscow, Castro's position was that having earlier supported the Eritrean cause he was unwilling to help fight it in the interests of the Soviet-Ethiopian alliance.

It was the Cubans who drew the Soviets into the conflict in Angola at a time when Moscow was still undecided about whether to intervene or not. Havana rather than Moscow, dictated the military tactics in Angola; on at least one occasion Castro openly criticized Soviet military advisers after the disastrous campaign they had planned against UNITA in 1987. In the end, it was Cuba and not the USSR which was engaged

with Angola and South Africa in the American-led initiative to reach an agreement for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Angola and to secure the implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 for the independence of Namibia. The USSR remained as observers on the sidelines of the negotiations; its role was confined to urging the Angolans to pursue the negotiations. It is a moot point whether Moscow in fact exercised any serious influence on Cuba in the negotiating process. The final withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola under the agreement reached with Luanda and Pretoria will finally remove its effective military presence in Africa; and with Cuba's economy in its present parlous state, as well as Castro's opposition to glasnost, it is doubtful whether Havana is likely, or capable, of intervening on any major scale in the continent in the future. Nevertheless, the influence of Castro as a respected figure in the non-aligned movement cannot be underestimated.

THE USSR AND ETHIOPIA.

Ethiopia has been the most important success of the USSR in helping to build up a genuinely Marxist revolutionary party in Africa. Its adventurous role in Ethiopia was the result of two different but connected interests. By 1975 the Soviets had learnt from their expensive mistakes in Africa not to place their confidence in a military or bourgeois-nationalist regime; they realised that to ensure a durable ally, it was necessary to create a committed vanguard party schooled in Marxist-Leninism.

They therefore used their military aid programme to persuade the regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam to convert his military regime into a Marxist Workers Party; at the same time they made a major effort in training a vanguard elite to run the new party. Moscow showed great patience and persistence in bringing the Workers Party of Ethiopia to fruition.

The second Soviet interest in building up a potentially durable alliance with Ethiopia was to secure naval facilities for the Soviet navy in the Red Sea - an ambition cherished by Russians since the early days of the Tsars in the 17th century because of the quest for "blue sea ports". This need for naval facilities in the Red Sea became more urgent with the build-up of the new Soviet navy under Admiral of the Fleet, V. Gorshkov, and because of the threat posed to the Soviet Union by the presence of American nuclear-armed submarines in the North Indian Ocean. Gorshkov played a significant role in Moscow's decision to switch its alliance from Somalia to Ethiopia.

The Soviet-supported revolution in Ethiopia has failed to develop fully only because of the opposition to it by the indomitable resistance of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF). Their resistance also encouraged other regions in the country to launch armed struggles against the Addis Ababa regime. Notwithstanding the combined efforts of the Ethiopian army - with a strength of

over 220,000 soldiers and conscripts, Soviet military supplies and Warsaw Pact military advisers - the EPLF has succeeded not only in surviving, but in 1988 it destroyed a third of the Ethiopian army at the battle of Afabit; while the TPLF now controls upward of 80 per cent of the province of Tigray.

Mengistu Haile Mariam - who describes the USSR as "the leader of the world's progressive forces" - has proved himself to be a faithful student of Moscow's teaching; nevertheless, he has stubbornly refused to listen to Soviet advice on the need to find a political settlement with the Eritreans, Tigrayans and the other dissident regional movements. This is an example ~~whether~~ of where the strong nationalist sentiments of a client state have made it resistant to foreign advice, even from a vital ally. With the Ethiopian revolution now stalemated, and with Gorbachev's commitment to collaborating with the US in negotiating regional conflicts, the future relationship between Moscow and Addis Ababa remains uncertain - particularly after the recent attempt by elements in the army to overthrow Mengistu.

THE USSR ROLE IN SOUTH AFRICA.

Moscow's role in South Africa and Namibia has been confined principally to support for the liberation struggle and strong diplomatic support for the international campaign against apartheid, including backing for mandatory sanctions and moves

to isolate South Africa in the world community. Its two favoured liberation movements are the African National Congress (ANC), which has an alliance with the SA Communist Party, and the South-West African People's Organisation of Namibia (SWAPO). When the ANC decided to establish a military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe, to launch an armed struggle against the Pretoria regime, Moscow pledged its full support and provided military aid and help with training its cadres. Because the ANC failed in its persistent attempts to win support from western nations - other than Sweden and some of the other Nordic countries - its ties with Moscow became increasingly close; but the ANC has never ceased from trying to win western support. Its sense of nationalism remains stronger than its attachment to Marxist ideology.

During the Brezhnev period, Moscow began to lose heart in the efficacy of an armed struggle against the formidable military fortress of South Africa, and through secret diplomacy began to encourage the necessity for political negotiations as a more hopeful way of ending apartheid. Under Gorbachev the opposition to armed struggle was made public - to the displeasure of the ANC. Although the ANC has always been in favour of political negotiations, it sees its armed struggle as an important, though not exclusive, instrument to compel the Pretoria regime to respond to the demand for a national conference representative of all four major racial communities in the country to discuss a new democratic constitution and the liquidation of the apartheid system.

In his book, Perestroika, New Thinking for Our Country and the World, Gorbachev wrote: "The Soviet Union has no special interest in Southern Africa. We want only one thing: nations and countries in the region must at last have the chance to settle their development issues, their home and foreign affairs, independently, in peace and stability". When Mozambique's president, Joaquim Chissano, visited Moscow in August 1987, the Soviet leader told him that the USSR's policy was not directed towards obtaining a unilateral advantage in Southern Africa; future aid would concentrate on humanitarian and economic projects rather than on the supply of military weapons". Perhaps even more significantly he went on to say: "The USSR does not support the argument of 'the worse, the better' ", and expressed the belief that while the collapse of apartheid was inevitable, he favoured a political solution for the problems of the region. This declaration against revolutionary violence was made even more explicit by the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Anatole Adamishin, in an interview with the BBC in December 1987 when he declared that the USSR wanted to avoid "suffering and bloody death in South Africa... We think we have a common interest with America in stability in the region and that, sometimes, we can take useful steps with the Americans". This statement was made during the preliminary negotiations with the US Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Dr. Chester Crocker, that led to the agreements over Angola and Namibia.

SOVIET NEW THINKING

The licence provided by perestroika has enabled Soviet officials and academics to speak out against the misconceptions of the struggle in South Africa and to reveal doubts about past Soviet policies in the region. Thus, Boris Assoyan who had spent several years as a Moscow diplomat in Lesotho, wrote: "If you imagine revolution as a ... short and spontaneous outbreak of revolutionary force, then such a revolution (in South Africa), under prevalent conditions, is scarcely possible... In the South African context, a revolution can take place only over a relatively long period of revolutionary struggle, international pressure and complicated diplomatic and political maneuvers".[7] Quoting Lenin, he said that it was a mistake to think that the revolutionary classes always have sufficient power to manage the overthrow. Even more stark was the view expressed by Dr. Victor Goncharev, a deputy-director of the Moscow Institute of African Studies, that it would take at least ten years for black South Africans to achieve their liberation, and from twenty five to a hundred years to bring about "a socialist revolution".[8]

The new Soviet line that violence is inappropriate in the struggle against apartheid does not rule out other forceful measures, such as sanctions.

In how far can it be said that Soviet policy towards South Africa has changed under Gorbachev? Clearly, the open repudiation of armed struggle marks a significant change of policy. However, Goncharev and others argue that the

"fundamentals of Soviet policy have not changed" since it had never seen the region as an arena for super-power rivalry. He explains: "There may be changes and differences of approach to these problems; to behave more realistically, more flexibly, with every side participating in the resolution of the conflicts".

Addressing Moscow's reversal on the issue of armed struggle, Dr. Vladimir I. Tikhomirov, the research coordinator at the Moscow Institute for African Studies, explains that the Soviet Union saw armed struggle as a temporary measure - not as a means to achieve the final objective of bringing down the South African government, but only as a way of bringing it to accepting the need for a negotiated settlement. "What needs to be taken into account", Tikhomirov has written, "is that any armed struggle has its own limits, and that it is inadmissible to allow organised resistance to the oppression of the Pretoria authorities to degenerate into runaway terrorism. Besides, the Soviet Union does not believe that a large-scale civil war in South Africa - and still worse if it breaks out on a nationalist or ethnic basis, the possibility of which cannot be ruled out - would be the best way of solving the problems confronting that long-suffering country". Yu. Yukalov, the head of the USSR Foreign Ministry's Department of African Countries, confirms this explanation of Moscow's position on armed struggle. "We have never elevated the armed struggle into an absolute", he said in an interview. "In settling acute conflict situations we call on all sides to rely upon the strength of politics, rather than the force of arms".

(It is pertinent to reflect that, to date, no Soviet official has publicly expressed a similar view about the acute conflict situation in Ethiopia).

What message does Gorbachev's policy of perestroika send to socialist movements in the Third World ? Addressing this question, Tikhomirov explains: "The USSR holds that the situation in Southern Africa requires in the first place the necessity to comply strictly with the principle of freedom of social choice for every nation in the region. In practical terms, this means that while the Soviet Union has given, and continues to give, broad support to the countries that have opted for socialism, it also commits itself to respect the choice that has been made, or will be made, by other states as long as it is a free and democratic choice".[12] In support of this view he quotes Gorbachev's statement to the Zambian president, Kenneth Kaunda, in November 1987: "The Soviet Union supports the right of every nation independently to choose ways and forms of its development".[13]

THE END OF SUPER-POWER RIVALRY IN AFRICA?

Is it now possible to envisage that Africa will cease to be an arena for rivalry between the US and its western allies, on one side, and the Soviet bloc on the other ? It is much too early to attempt a confident answer to this question. Rivalries still persist. Gorbachev has not yet agreed to American and British proposals to cooperate in ending the regional conflicts

in the Horn of Africa along the same lines as was followed in the negotiations over Angola and Namibia: is this, perhaps, because the USSR is in a stronger position in Ethiopia than it was in Angola, and/or because of Soviet strategic interest in the Red Sea? Or is it simply because Gorbachev needs more time to prepare the ground in Ethiopia for a super-power initiative? The USSR has, as yet, given no sign of being willing to end its substantial arms sales to Col. Qadhafy of Libya despite strong American demands that it should do so. In Angola - even after the settlement - the Soviet Union remains pledged to continue supplying the MPLA government with arms, while the US is similarly pledged to continuing its military assistance to UNITA; so both powers continue to arm their local allies in Angola's nasty civil war, and are committed to continue doing so until the parties to the conflict agree to a policy of reconciliation.

On the positive side, there is the successful cooperation in settling the immediate issue of foreign troops in Angola and the independence of Namibia. American and Soviet academics are currently engaged in a collaborative programme to prepare joint projects in Africa. Soviet academics are now free to express their views freely (and often in disagreement with each other) at regular seminars and conferences with western academics. The USSR has encouraged white South Africans, not only liberals, to come to Moscow, and has sent some of its journalists to the land of apartheid.

While the US has welcomed and encouraged this thawing of the formerly permafrost relationship in Africa, Washington's suspicions remain strong. The view of the State Department is that while the right noises are coming from Gorbachev, what is still missing is the implementation of his promises. Even the successful collaboration over Angola and Namibia has not yet dispelled these suspicions, although it has helped somewhat to lessen them.

Two major tests remain before there can be any certainty that the era of super-power rivalry in Africa was finally ended: Soviet willingness to cooperate in resolving the acute conflicts in the Horn of Africa; and American willingness to involve the USSR in helping to promote political negotiations in South Africa. While Gorbachev has remained silent over future Soviet policy in Ethiopia, he has been explicit in defining a possible Soviet role in Southern Africa.

"The efforts to defuse conflict situations in the world", he has said, "call for innovative approaches and a new political thinking that is based on realities and takes into account the interests of all the sides. This approach has been reflected, in part, in the proposals for a national reconciliation in Afghanistan, and a political settlement of the situation there. The principle of political settlement can undoubtedly be applied to the problems of Southern Africa. If guarantees are needed for a political decision to be arrived at, such guarantees could be contemplated by the United Nations, through the permanent members of the Security Council. As to the Soviet Union, it is prepared to play its positive role in this process". [14]

NOTES

1. See George F Padmore, Pan-Africanism or Communism; Dobson, London 1956; and C.L.R.James, The Black Jacobins; Secker and Warburg, London 1938.

2. For a more detailed discussion of Soviet policy in Africa, see R. Craig Nation and Mark V. Kauppie,(Eds) The Soviet Impact in Africa, Lexington Books, Toronto, 1984; David E Albright (Ed) Africa and International Communism Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1980; and Andrzej Korbonski and Francis Fukuyama (eds), The Soviet Union and the Third World Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1987.

3. For a discussion on Soviet policy in Eritrea, see Colin Legum et al in La Corne de L' Afrique;L'Harmattan, Paris 1986.

4. Robert Pastor Cuba and the Soviet Union: Does Cuba Act Alone?; chapter in Barry B Levine (ed). The New Cuban Presence in the Caribbean Basin: Wesrview, Boulder Co. 1983.

5. ~~Source to come~~ See Colin Legum, After Angola, The Coming War in Africa; Rex Collings, London, 1976.

6. See Colin Legum and Bill Lee: Conflict in The Horn of Africa (1977) and Continuing Conflict in the Horn of Africa (1978); Rex Collings, London.

7. Doris Assoyan, Literaturnaya Gazetta, Moscow; 7 October 1987.

8. V.Goncherov's interview in Work in Progress, Johannesburg; June 1987.

9. Ibid.

10. V.I. Tikhomirov: Soviet Policy in Southern Africa in the Africa Contemporary Record 1988-89; Africana, New York, 1989.

11. ~~Source to come~~ Izvestia, 30 December 1988.

12. Tikhomirov, op cit.

13. ~~Source to come~~. Izvestia, 28 November 1988.

14. ~~Source to come~~. Ibid.